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Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid 
Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data   
Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman∗ 
 
We explore how examiner behavior is altered by the time allocated for reviewing patent 
applications.  Insufficient examination time may hamper examiner search and rejection efforts, 
leaving examiners more inclined to grant invalid applications.  To test this prediction, we use 
application-level data to trace the behavior of individual examiners over the course of a series of 
promotions that carry with them reductions in examination-time allocations.  We find evidence 
demonstrating that such promotions are associated with reductions in examination scrutiny and 
increases in granting tendencies, as well as evidence that those additional patents being issued 
on the margin are of below-average quality.     
 
Evidence suggests that patents play an important role in both promoting innovative activity 
and shaping the direction of technological growth (Moser, 2004).  In recent years, however, the 
patent system has come under voracious criticism (Burk & Lemley, 2009).  Critiques of the 
system has largely coalesced around one charge:  the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent 
Office or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents—i.e., patents on inventions that fail to 
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meet the patentability requirements (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004).  In board terms, a Pat6ent Office that 
is routinely granting patents on inventions that are already known or represent only a trivial 
advancement over current scientific understanding will tend to burden society with the 
deadweight losses associated with monopoly protection without reaping the benefits of spurred 
innovation (Nordhaus 1969).  In addition, invalidly issued patents can be utilized by 
nonpracticing entities or “patent trolls” to opportunistically extract licensing fees from 
innovators, while also stunting follow-on discoveries in markets characterized by cumulative 
innovation (Scotchmer 1991, Sampat and Williams 2014, Galasso and Schankerman 2014).   
Although commentators have suggested a plethora of reasons as to why the Agency may be 
biased towards allowing patents, there exists little compelling empirical evidence that any 
particular feature of the Patent Office actually induces the Agency to over-grant patents.1  Absent 
such evidence, policymakers are provided with little guidance as to how to address the root 
causes of the patent quality crisis.  This paper begins to rectify this deficiency by addressing one 
feature of the Patent Office that scholars have identified as likely to influence an examiner’s 
decision to grant a patent:  the time allotted to review a patent application (Jaffe and Lerner, 
2004).  Because patent applications are presumed to comply with the statutory patentability 
requirements when filed, the burden of proving unpatentability rests with the Agency.  That is, a 
patent examiner who fails to explicitly set forth reasons as to why the application fails to meet 
the patentability standards must grant the patent.  To the extent that examiners are given 
insufficient examination time, one might expect them to conduct limited reviews of applications, 
leaving them in a weaker position to identify proper bases of rejections and thereby leaving them 
in a position where they must grant patents at elevated rates in light of this legal presumption of 
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1
  See, however, Frakes and Wasserman (2013, 2015), which explore how the Patent Office’s fee schedule, along with the 
Office’s inability to finally reject a patent application, creates an incentive for a financially constrained agency to allow 
additional patents.  
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validity.  Much anecdotal evidence has been put forth to suggest that patent examiners indeed 
face binding examination time constraints, implicating such concerns.2       
To more comprehensively test this simple hypothesis and challenge this anecdotal sentiment, 
we rely upon the fact that examination times decrease upon certain types of examiner promotion.  
Our basic empirical strategy is to follow individual examiners throughout the course of their 
careers and to track the evolution of their examination behavior—including their granting rates—
as they experience promotions that diminish the amount of examination time at their disposal.  
Bolstering our ability to separate the effect of allocated examination time from other factors that 
may change generally upon promotion is the fact that examiner promotions and pay raises come 
in several varieties, some of which bear on examination times and some of which do not.  Our 
identification strategy is further strengthened by the fact that the promotions of interest do not 
transpire lock-step with increases in years of experience, allowing us to decouple an experience 
effect from a promotion-of-interest effect, combined with the fact that applications are generally 
randomly assigned to examiners within technology groups.   
To execute this empirical strategy, we estimate examiner fixed-effects specifications using 
novel, micro-level data on over 1 million patent applications disposed of between 2002 and 
2012, merged with rich, examiner roster data received from the Patent Office pursuant to a series 
of Freedom of Information Act requests (FOIA).  Our results suggest that as an examiner is 
given less time to review an application, the less active she becomes in searching for prior art, 
the less likely she becomes to make obviousness rejections (which are especially time-intensive 
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2
  In an August 2010 report commissioned by the Patent Office to reassess the schedule by which they set examination-
time expectations (which we obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act Request), the Manhattan Strategy Group stated 
the following:  
Examiners consistently expressed the need for additional time.  This was stated mostly in concern to not being able to 
do a high-quality examination and to avoid taking short-cuts.  As one examiner in [Technology Center] 1700 
explained, “when you add it up its not enough time to do a proper job on a case.”  A junior examiner expressed a 
similar sentiment, stating that “rather than doing what I feel is ultimately right, I’m essentially fighting for my life.” 
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exercises), and the more likely she becomes to grant the patent.  Under the assumption that 
patent examiners who are allocated sufficient time to review applications will, on average, make 
the correct patentability determinations, our results suggest that the time allotments may be 
inducing patent examiners to grant invalid patents on the margin.  Supporting the view that these 
marginal patents may be of questionable quality / validity, we find that examination-time-
reducing promotions are associated with a reduction in the frequency by which the inventors of 
U.S. issued patents are likewise successful in securing patent protection at the European Patent 
Office and the Japan Patent Office—two agencies following essentially similar patentability 
requirements but that expend greater resources per application than the U.S. Patent Office.  
At first blush, it may not be surprising that the level of scrutiny afforded applications may, at 
some point, fall as allocated examination time becomes sufficiently strained.  Importantly, our 
findings demonstrate that this is not merely a hypothetical scenario but instead that examiners 
appear to be operating at the point where time constraints indeed bind.  That is, our results 
suggest that current reductions in time allocations upon promotion are hampering the ability of 
examiners to fully evaluate the merits of the given applications and thus ensure that only 
meritorious applications are granted.3  Moreover, we demonstrate that the magnitude of the 
resulting impact on examiner granting tendencies is substantial.  As examination time is cut 
roughly in half (i.e., as an examiner rises from GS-7 to GS-14 along the General Schedule scale, 
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 Temporal limits placed upon workers to complete specific tasks are naturally related to production targets enforced 
over specified measurement periods.  Indeed, as discussed below and in the Online Appendix, the Patent Office’s time allocations 
are effectuated via an examination quota system that is monitored bi-weekly and at quarter ends.  Though our discussion focuses 
on the behavior of patent examiners at the U.S. Patent Office, the analysis contributes to a broader literature in personnel 
economics and human resource management on the productivity consequences of workload expectations and quotas and on the 
timing associated with measuring employee output.  Notable examples of such studies include Asch (1990), Oyer (1998), Courty 
and Marshke (2004), Larkin (2014), and Chan (2015 a).  The present investigation into the effects of time constraints on patent 
examiner behavior is likewise related to research bearing on the distortions in worker behaviors that may arise in connection with 
the time constraints that workers—e.g., physicians—face near the ends of scheduled shifts.  See, for example, Chan (2015 b).  
More broadly, this analysis is related to research on the distortionary effects of objective performance measures (Baker, Gibbons, 
and Murphy, 1994).         
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controlling for changes in years of experience), our findings suggest that grant rates rise by as 
much as 10 to 19 percentage points, or by roughly 15 to 28 percent.4   
Despite a substantial literature in economics bearing on the patent system,5 the administrative 
process by which patent rights are initially established has received scant attention.  To date, 
only a handful of studies have explored the dynamics of the Patent Office, primarily by 
investigating the role of examiner heterogeneity in explaining the outcomes of the patenting 
process (Cockburn, Kortum, & Stern, 2003; Lichtman, 2004; Mann, 2014).  These 
groundbreaking studies raise concerns of an inefficient and inequitable Patent Office, 
demonstrating that application outcomes are largely a function of the examiners that applicants 
randomly receive.  However, these studies fail to explore arguably the most important outcome 
of this process—whether the examiner granted the patent—while also failing to examine whether 
a particular feature of the Patent Office influenced the examiner’s behavior.   
Lemley and Sampat (2012) arguably come closest to filling this gap in the literature, 
estimating a monotonically increasing relationship between years of examiner experience and 
examiner grant rates.  Given the natural connection between experience and promotion, their 
analysis, as they note, likely captures some aspects of the impact of allotted examination time on 
grant rates; though, absent data on examiner promotions, they are unable to decouple an 
experience effect from an examination-time-allotment effect.  Moreover, their analysis is largely 
cross-sectional in nature (observing 10,000 patent applications filed in January 2001), hindering 
their ability to distinguish between the effect of experience itself from either an examiner cohort 
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4
  Notably, our findings also challenge the widely held belief that decreasing patent examiner attrition is vital to 
increasing patent quality (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004). 
5
  This literature has ranged from analyses on how to value patent rights (Pakes, 1986; Jaffe et al., 1993; Harhoff et al., 
1999; Hall et al., 2005), to studies exploring the effect of patents on innovation (Mansfield, 1986; Griliches, 1990; Cohen et al., 
2000), to research on the ways in which patents are used and enforced once granted (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997), among other 
investigations. 
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effect or an examiner tenure effect.  By tracking individual examiners over the course of a ten-
year period, our fixed-effects specifications are able to overcome these concerns.  While our 
focus is on understanding the impact of reductions in allocated examination time and not 
necessarily on the independent impacts of examiner experience, we note that the imposition of 
examiner fixed effects produces an inverse-U shape in the relationship between grant rates and 
experience, as opposed to the monotonically increasing relationship documented in Lemley and 
Sampat (2012).  In other specifications that are in the spirit of a regression-discontinuity design, 
we find evidence suggestive of a strictly negative influence of experience (in years) on grant 
rates, combined with discrete jumps in grant rates upon the relevant promotions. 
In the next section, we provide a background on the patent examination process and discuss 
our theoretical predictions.  In Sections II and III, we describe our data and empirical 
methodology, respectively.  Section IV presents results from our examiner fixed-effects analysis.  
Finally, Section V concludes.
I. BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
A. Description of Examination Process 
Every patent application filed with the Patent Office contains a specification, which describes 
the invention, and a set of claims that defines the metes and bounds of the legal rights the 
applicant is seeking.  Moreover, to satisfy applicants’ duty of candor under U.S. law, patent 
applications typically disclose to the Agency “prior art,” that is previous patents, patent 
applications, or other publications, that are material to the patentability of the relevant invention.   
Before an application enters examination, it is routed to an Art Unit, a group of eight to fifteen 
patent examiners who review applications in the same technological field.  Upon arrival, the 
Supervisory Patent Examiner (SPE) of that Art Unit randomly assigns the application to a 
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specific examiner.  Occasionally, SPEs make non-random assignments, but in those instances, 
they do so not based on any characteristic that would affect the patentability of the application 
but instead, for instance, on an examiner’s backlog of applications (Lemley & Sampat, 2012).6   
The assigned examiner assesses the patentability of the invention based on the criteria outlined 
in the Patent Act.  Without making any reference to prior art, an examiner can deny a patent on 
the grounds that the claimed invention does not involve statutory subject matter (35 U.S.C. § 
101), that the invention is not useful (35 U.S.C. §101) or that the application fails to satisfy the 
disclosure requirements (35 U.S.C. § 112).  In contrast, two other grounds for rejection—i.e., 
lack of novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102) and obviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103)—require the examiner to 
make a comparison of the claimed invention with the background art already known to the 
public.  Before making this assessment, the examiner conducts her own prior art search to 
supplement that disclosed by the patent applicant. Because lack-of-novelty and obviousness 
rejections require this delicate prior art comparison (and underlying search), they are typically 
viewed as being more time consuming to perform than non-art-based rejections.  Obviousness 
rejections are especially time intensive in this regard, even relative to novelty rejections.   While 
novelty assessments require that examiners determine whether the claimed invention is covered 
by a single prior publication or patent, an obviousness determination requires an examiner to 
start with a prior art reference that covers only a portion of the invention and then piece together 
additional references or rely upon what is known to one of ordinary skill in the art in order to 
determine whether it would be “obvious” to modify any one of the cited prior art references to 
achieve the claimed invention.     
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6
  We conducted a series of telephone interviews with former SPEs to confirm these details of patent examination 
assignment.  Our interviews further substantiated that SPEs do not make any substantive evaluation of an application before 
assigning it to a particular examiner.   
	

After assessing the patentability of the claims, an examiner composes a “first office action” 
letter to the applicant that accepts or rejects them.  Although some applications are allowed in 
their entirety upon first examination, more frequently, some or all of the claims fail to meet at 
least one of the patentability requirements, as the examiner will detail in the first office action 
letter.  The applicant then responds by amending the claims or disputing the rejection.  After the 
response, a patent examiner may issue a final rejection or allow the patent to issue.7   
B. Examination-Time Allocations 
A number of scholars have surmised that the time constraints facing patent examiners in 
assessing the patentability of claims are partly responsible for the Patent Office allowing too 
many invalid patents (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004; Lemley, 2001; Lemley and Sampat 2012).  
Although it may take several years from filing a patent application for an applicant to receive a 
final patentability decision from the Patent Office, on average, an examiner spends only nineteen 
hours reviewing an application, including reading the patent application, searching for prior art, 
comparing the prior art with the patent application, writing a rejection, responding to the patent 
applicant’s arguments, and often conducting an interview with the applicant’s attorney (Frakes & 
Wasserman, 2014).  If, over these hours, examiners are unable to conduct a sufficient search of 
prior art and determine and articulate a proper basis of rejection in the relevant office action 
report, they are expected, under the law, to allow applications.  In light of this legal presumption 
of validity, one might predict that a further tightening of time constraints will only cut the 
underlying search and evaluation period even shorter and cause examiners to error even further 
 
7
  After receiving a final rejection, an aggrieved patent applicant can restart the examination process by filing a 
continuation application, appeal the denied application to Patent Trial and Appeal Board, or abandon the application altogether.  
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on the side of allowing additional patents on the margin that might have otherwise been rejected 
if given sufficient time.8   
As explained in greater detail in the Online Appendix, the Patent Office sets expectations 
regarding the amount of time examiners should spend on applications.9  The number of hours 
allocated for review depends on both the technological field in which the examiner is working 
and on her position in the general schedule (GS) pay scale.  A patent examiner in a more 
complex field is provided more hours to review an application than an examiner of the same 
grade who is working in a less complex field.  The higher the pay grade of an examiner within a 
technology area the fewer number of hours the Patent Office extends to that examiner.  A 
promotion to each subsequent pay grade is roughly equated to a ten to fifteen percent decrease in 
the number of allocated examination hours.   
To demonstrate the degree to which time allocations scale with GS-level changes, we present 
in Table 1 the examination time expectations facing a patent examiner working in one of the 
most complex fields, artificial intelligence, and one of the least complex fields, compound tools.  
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	 That is, the underlying legal landscape leads to a simple prediction that time constraints will produce a bias towards 
granting, as opposed to producing symmetrical noise in the examination process.  We acknowledge the possibility that certain 
examiners may decline to follow this legal presumption of validity when faced with time pressures and simply write up an ill-
conceived and vague rejection.  However, it is perhaps unlikely that reductions in the total amount of time allocated for the 
review process will incentivize non-compliant but nonetheless time-constrained examiners to issue more rejections of this 
particular nature.  Mainly, it is important to acknowledge that preparing a notice of allowance (which essentially requires no 
justification) is still less time intensive to produce than even a vaguely worded and weak rejection.  Furthermore, to the extent 
that examiners were to issue easily overcome rejections in non-final office actions, they might have little hope of dispensing with 
the application with finality; rather they would perhaps merely be inviting applicants to articulate proper responses, an event that 
will only require additional time outlays on the examiners’ part at a future date.  Finally, there may be reason to doubt why 
examiners would be inclined to disregard the legal presumption of validity in the first place and thus be motivated to issue 
rejections of this vague and weak variety.  Such behaviors may be scrutinized during the evaluation processes they are put 
through at times.  Moreover, rejections of this nature may more easily invite appeals by applicants, events that may likewise lead 
to certain repercussions for the associated examiners.  All told, we predict that time constraints will cause examiners to error on 
the side of allowing more patents, as opposed to erring in both directions.      
9
  These time allotments have largely remained unchanged since 1976.  The Patent Office has created new patent 
classifications as a result of new and emerging technology.  Once the Agency has set the time allotments for a new technology 
these allocations also have largely remained unchanged.  In 2010, however, the Patent Office increased the time allotments for 
every application by two hours.   
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As demonstrated by this table, examiners operating at GS-level 14 are expected to review the 
same patent in approximately half that time of examiners operating at GS-level 7.   
 
TABLE 1: EXAMINATION HOURS ALLOCATED TO EXAMINER AS A FUNCTION OF GS-LEVEL 
 (1) (2) 
GS-level Compound Tools Artificial Intelligence 
GS-7 19.7 45.1 
GS-9 17.3 39.5 
GS-11 15.3 35.1 
GS-12 13.8 31.6 
GS-13 12.0 27.5 
GS-13, partial signatory 11.0 25.3 
GS-14 10.2 23.4 
 
 
C. Promotion Process 
Patent examiners are hired at different pay grades (GS-5, GS-7, GS-9, GS-11 or GS-12) 
depending upon their educational background and prior experience.  Promotions at low pay 
grades typically (though not always) occur within a year for examiners that meet their workload 
expectations with few errors.  An examiner’s error rate is calculated by reviewing some subset of 
the examiner’s work product to see if, for instance, the examiner fails to include all grounds of 
rejections that should have been made or if she includes unreasonable rejections.  In contrast, 
promotions at the high pay grades (GS-12, 13, and 14) often require more time, as they generally 
involve the completion of additional testing or programs.10          
While we contend that the most significant change associated with a promotion that bears on 
the examiner’s decision to grant a patent application is the time allocated to review an 
 
 For instance, to be eligible for a GS-13 promotion, examiners must demonstrate legal competency by successfully 
complete training courses and passing written tests on subjects such as patent law, practice, and procedure.       
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application, there is, upon promotion within GS-13 and to GS-14, also a change in the scrutiny of 
their work.  Examiners at pay grades GS-13 and below must have their decisions reviewed by an 
examiner that has “full signatory authority.”11   Patent examiners at pay grades GS-13 may begin 
to work towards obtaining such authority by undergoing an evaluation period, which upon 
successful completion will result in a promotion to a patent examiner with “partial signatory 
authority.”  A GS-13 partial signatory promotion, though not associated with a change in the GS 
level, does entail a decrease in the examination time allotted to the promoted examiner and 
provides that examiner the ability to sign off independently on first office actions.  Upon 
completing a second period of evaluation, a GS-13 partial-signatory patent examiner can be 
promoted to GS-14, a promotion which provides the examiner with full signatory authority or the 
right to sign off on all aspects of an application independently.  The fact that variations in 
scrutiny of this nature do not occur upon all examination-time-reducing promotions is an 
important component to our identification strategy, as discussed in Section IV below.12     
To our knowledge, nothing else changes upon GS-level promotions that would affect the 
manner in which examiners conduct their examination.  For instance, the basic structure of 
overtime and bonuses remains constant upon GS-level promotions as does the ways in which 
examiners earn work credits, in which event one would not expect examiners to face enhanced 
financial incentives to grant patents (to the extent that they ever face such incentives) upon 
promotions to higher grade levels.  We confirmed that GS-level promotions are not associated 
 
11
  Even though these “junior” examiners do most of the work on the application they are listed as secondary examiners on 
the application.   
 Although the determinants of GS-13 partial-signatory and GS-14 promotions are similar to lower level promotions—
meet workload expectations with few errors—the evaluation period is more formalized with these higher-level promotions.  That 
is, unlike lower-level promotions, examiners who wish to be eligible for signatory authority must affirmatively agree to 
participate in an evaluation period in which a larger portion of their work product is reviewed for clear errors than if they had not 
agreed to participate in the signatory authority program.
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with such changes through our review of examiner compensation materials made available by 
the Patent Office and through our interviews with former SPEs. 
D. Hypothesis 
We assume that, when given sufficient time, examiners will conduct their examination 
practices in line with proper patentability standards.  However, binding time constraints may 
force examiners of this otherwise competent disposition to decrease the degree to which they 
search prior art, decrease their ability to extend meaningful obviousness rejections and thus 
increase the propensity by which they grant patents.  We surmise that examiner promotions of 
the variety that decrease the amount of time expected to review applications will only tighten 
these constraints and intensify such outcomes. 
II. DATA  
Most prior investigations into the determinants of examiner behavior have explored only 
issued patents (for example, Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern, 2003).  Among other things, a 
sampling frame of that nature is insufficient to capture arguably the most important decision that 
an examiner must make: whether or not to grant the given patent application.  Moreover, when 
prior studies have considered application-level data, they have done so only with respect to a 
subset of applications at one snapshot in time,13 which is insufficient to account for sources of 
examiner heterogeneity that may bias the analysis.  To overcome these deficiencies and to 
facilitate a rich examiner-fixed-effects design, we collected individual application data from the 
Patent Office’s Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) database on all 1.4 million 
utility patent applications that were filed on or after March, 2001 and that reached a final 
 
13
  For example, Lemley and Sampat (2012) consider only 10,000 applications filed in January of 2001.   
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disposition—i.e., excluding ongoing applications—by July 2012.  The Online Appendix provides 
more specifics regarding the construction of this sample.     
Though especially rich in content, the PAIR database is not readily suitable for a 
comprehensive, machine-readable analysis of granting practices considering that the data is 
divided into separate webpages for each individual application, with each webpage providing 
information via numerous tab delimited and portable document format (pdf) files.  Because of 
the nontrivial nature of this data collection we utilized the National Center for Supercomputing 
Applications at the University of Illinois to amass and coordinate information contained across 
the 1+ million different webpages.  Specifically, we collected information on the status of the 
application as well as other information about the prosecution process, including, among others, 
the patent examiner charged with reviewing the application and the basis of any rejection 
associated with the application (e.g., obviousness).   
Critical to our analysis is determining the experience (in years) and the GS-level for each of 
the 9,000 examiners represented in our analytical file.  For these purposes, we match the 
examiner field in the PAIR data with the two sets of examiner rosters received pursuant to 
separate FOIA requests, one of which dates back to 1992 to facilitate the identification of 
experienced examiners at the beginning of our sample.  We describe these rosters and this 
matching process (including our handling of “fuzzy” name matches) in greater detail in the 
Online Appendix.  We likewise provide a breakdown in the Online Appendix of the percentage 
of applications reviewed by examiners in each of the relevant GS-levels and experience groups 
considered below.  The greatest percentages are accounted for by the higher GS-levels (GS-level 
12+) considering that examiners spend considerably more time at such ranges.  Finally, we treat 
the individual who did the majority of work on the application as the examiner charged with 

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reviewing that application:  (1) the non-signatory examiner, when both a non-signatory and an 
examiner with signatory authority are associated with an application, or (2) the signatory 
examiner, when only one examiner is associated with an application. 
For each application in our sample, we relate examiner characteristics, including their pay 
grade and experience level, to whether or not the application was granted, our key outcome of 
interest.  All told, 68 percent of the applications disposed of over this time period were granted 
(see Table 2).14  To form our second set of outcome measures, we determine whether the given 
application had at least one claim rejected during examination based on each of the following 
statutory bases: § 101 (lack of patentable subject matter, lack of utility, double patenting), § 102 
(lack of novelty), § 103 (obvious), and § 112 (failure to meet the disclosure requirements).  To 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report the bases of rejections for any substantial 
sample of patent applications.15  Details regarding the process utilized to collect the rejection-
type data can be found in the Online Appendix.  The likelihood that a given application received 
each of the indicated types of rejections in the sample are as follows: (1) 11 percent, § 101; (2) 
56 percent, § 102; (3) 72 percent, § 103; and (4) 35 percent, § 112.   
To proxy for how intensively examiners are searching for prior art, we focus on the sample of 
patents issued over the above-specified time period (as distinct from the sample of applications 
over this time period) and collect information on the share of prior art references listed in each 
 
14
   Continuation applications, as distinct from the now more common RCEs, are counted as a rejection / abandonment of 
the original application and the filing of a new application within the PAIR database (RCEs, which keep the same serial number 
and stay with the same examiner, are not treated as new applications).  Accordingly, this 68 percent rate does not necessarily 
capture the percentage of original applications that are ultimately allowed considering that some continuation applications may 
successfully issue.  It is important to note that this is merely a classification issue—i.e., do these events contribute or not 
contribute to the Patent Office’s grant rate?  Our focus is largely on exploring the relationship between the grant rate, however it 
is defined, and certain characteristics of the examiners.   
15
  Cotropia, et al., 2013, however, have previously reported rejection data for 1,554 patents issued in 2007. 

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issued patent that emanate from the examiner rather than the applicant.16  Previous investigations 
have reported that examiners are more likely to rely upon prior art they discovered during their 
own search, rather than art disclosed by an applicant, to reject a patent application (Cotropia, 
Lemley, and Sampat, 2013). 
 
TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
  
Incidence of Granted Patent 
0.678 
(0.467) 
Incidence of Any Obviousness Rejection  
0.717 
(0.450) 
Share of Rejections based on Obviousness 
0.454 
(0.283) 
Share of Prior Art Citations Originating from Examiner 
0.546 
(0.369) 
Incidence of U.S. Patent being Allowed by both EPO and JPO (among Patent 
Family Sample) 
0.442 
(0.497) 
Incidence of U.S. Patent being Allowed by EPO (among Patent Family 
Sample) 
0.604 
(0.490) 
Incidence of U.S. Patent being Allowed by JPO (among Patent Family 
Sample) 
0.637 
(0.481) 
Incidence of Large-Entity Applicant 
0.734 
(0.442) 
Incidence of Foreign Priority (at EPO or JPO) 
0.086 
(0.280) 
Statistics are from the collection of applications in the Patent Office’s s PAIR database that 
reached a final disposition and that were published in the PAIR records between March, 2001 
and July, 2012.  Statistics bearing on EPO and JPO allowance rates are from the subset of 
patents that were granted out of this initial set of applications and whose applicant’s likewise 
sought patent protection at the EPO and JPO.   
 
A final set of outcome measures considered in the analysis below is meant to reflect on the 
quality of the patents issued by the Patent Office.  As explained in Section IV, we assess these 
outcomes by looking at a set of inventions that sought protection at each of the U.S. Patent 
 
16
  This measure includes patent and non-patent prior art (and foreign prior art), though the results presented below are 
robust to just focusing on patent prior art.  Several studies have used the share of references listed in an issued patent originating 
from the applicant or examiner as a proxy for the extent to which the party in question (examiner or applicant) searched the prior 
art (Lemley and Sampat, 2012; Sampat, 2010; Alcacer et al., 2009). 

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Office, the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO) and observe 
whether patents issued in the U.S. were allowed or rejected at the EPO and/or JPO.  We obtained 
this information using the Triadic Patent Family database maintained by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.   
III. METHODOLOGY 
To explore how patent examination practices change upon promotions that leave examiners 
with less examination time, we estimate the following: 
	 
 	 	 	 	 	  		 		
 	   	 
(1) 
where a indexes the individual application, i indexes the individual examiner, k indexes the 
technology associated with the application and t indexes the year in which the application is 
disposed of by the examiner.  GRANTaikt indicates whether or not the given application was 
allowed by the examiner.  Year fixed effects are captured by .  GSit represents a set of dummy 
variables capturing the incidence of the examiner assigned to the underlying application falling 
into each of the general schedule (GS) pay-grade levels.  GSit also includes separate categories 
for GS-13 without partial signatory authority and GS-13 with partial signatory authority, 
considering that this unique within-GS-level promotion likewise carries with it reductions in 
examination-time expectations.  The ability to draw upon a within-GS-level change in the time 
allotment extended to examiners provides us with an opportunity to challenge the argument that 
the analysis may be purely driven by factors changing with GS-level promotions other than 
examination time allocations.    


Furthermore, included in some specifications, EXPERit captures a set of dummy variables for 
the incidence of the relevant examiner falling into a range of experience-level categories (0-1 
years, 2-3 years, etc.), where experience is signified by the number of years (in 2-year bins) at 
the time of the application’s disposition that the relevant examiner has been with the Patent 
Office.  In other specifications, as discussed in detail in Section IV, we nest experience within 
GS-level categories and thus create dummy variables capturing a series of experience categories 
within each GS-level.  In a robustness check, we include a set of technology-by-year fixed 
effects,  (using the 37 technology subcategories set forth in Hall et al., 2001), to alleviate 
concerns that examiners may be reassigned to different technologies as they ascend to higher 
pay-grades and that such reallocation schemes may change over time (e.g., with fluctuating 
economic conditions).17  Other specifications include various individual characteristics of the 
applications, 	, including the entity size status of the applicant (large versus small), the 
length of time being the filing and the disposition of the application (and its square), and the 
foreign priority status of the application (previous filings at the EPO and JPO).   
Importantly, a set of examiner fixed effects are captured by .  Such fixed effects help address 
concerns that more experienced examiners and higher GS-level examiners are fundamentally 
different from their more junior counterparts, for reasons beyond mere differences in seniority 
and promotion levels—e.g., concerns that examiners who have reached higher grade levels and 
thus who have been successful in attaining promotions may be those with a stronger inherent 
 
17
  We aggregate to the Hall et al. subcategory level (37 groups) in forming these technology-by-year fixed effects—as 
opposed to using the much finer grained U.S. Patent Office “classes” (over 500 groups)—for computational ease.  These 
technology-year fixed effects also address concerns that the Patent Office may execute more promotions during times in which 
application filings are elevated in particular technologies, events that may also impact observed grant rates.  We alternatively 
alleviate this concern in Column 2 of Table 3 by estimating specifications that include technology-year-specific filing counts as a 
control while using the finer-grained Patent Office classes as the basis for technology groupings.  In this alternative specification, 
we also include Patent Office class fixed effects to account for fixed differences across such groups.  As demonstrated by 
Column 2, the inclusion of class fixed effects and class-year filing counts leads to virtually no change in the estimated 
coefficients of the grade level dummies.   
	

disposition towards granting in the first place, along with concerns that more experienced 
examiners may also differ from less experienced examiners simply because they elected to stay 
at the Patent Office.   
IV. RESULTS 
A. Grant-Rate Analysis 
1. Primary Results 
We begin our exploration into the effects of allotted examination time—as identified by the 
occurrence of certain examiner promotions—by plotting the evolution of grant rates observed 
over the course of a given examiner’s career as they rise in the ranks.  More specifically, in 
Figure 1, we plot results from a regression of the incidence of an application being granted on a 
set of dummy variables capturing each of the relevant examiner pay grades, in addition to a set of 
year fixed effects and examiner fixed effects (see Column 1 of Table 3 for the tabular regression 
results underlying this figure).18  Figure 1 suggests that the grant rates increase with each grade-
level promotion, including increases as given examiners initially ascend to GS-level 13 and 
subsequently ascend to GS-level 13 with partial signatory authority.  We find that as an examiner 
moves from GS-level 7 to GS-level 9, they increase their grant rates by 3.8 percentage points (or 
by roughly 6 percent).  As the examiner ascends even higher in ranks and thus as the examiner 
receives less and less time to review her applications, this increase in grant rates continues 
 
18
  Standard errors are clustered at the examiner level to account for autocorrelation over time in examiner-specific 
residuals.  In unreported regressions, we also cluster at the NBER technology sub-category level (37 technologies).  Estimated 
standard errors only rise slightly in this instance—e.g., from 0.009 on average throughout Column 1 of Table 2 to 0.010 on 
average throughout that Column.  Given computational considerations in light of the over-1-million observations and nearly 
9,000 examiner fixed effects, we elect to estimate linear probability models throughout.  We note, however, that the pattern of 
results we present are virtually unchanged when we instead take a 10-percent random sub-sample of examiners and estimate 
conditional logit specifications (available upon request from the authors).   



monotonically until the point at which her grant rate at GS-level 14 is 18.6 percentage points (or 
nearly 28 percent) higher than it was when she was at GS-7.     
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Examiner GS Levels and Grant Rate 
Notes: this figure presents results from a regression of a dummy variable indicating a granted application on dummy 
variables representing each General Schedule level between 7 and 14, including both GS-13 with and without partial 
signatory authority.  The dummy variable for GS-level 7 is omitted, representing the reference group.  The vertical 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients.  Regressions include examiner and year fixed 
effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the examiner level.  
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TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRANT RATES AND EXPERIENCE AND GRADE LEVELS OF 
THE ASSOCIATED PATENT EXAMINER 
      	
Omitted: GS-7      
(omitted: 
GS-11) 
GS-9 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.036*** 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.036*** 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.020) 
- 
GS-11 
0.077*** 
(0.008) 
0.076*** 
(0.008) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.072*** 
(0.008) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
- 
GS-12 
0.115*** 
(0.009) 
0.112*** 
(0.009) 
0.049*** 
(0.009) 
0.104*** 
(0.008) 
0.060*** 
(0.023) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
GS-13 
0.148*** 
(0.009) 
0.141*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.010) 
0.127*** 
(0.009) 
0.068** 
(0.025) 
0.062*** 
(0.007) 
GS-13 (with partial 
signatory authority) 
0.168*** 
(0.010) 
0.159*** 
(0.010) 
0.084*** 
(0.011) 
0.149*** 
(0.010) 
0.076*** 
(0.027) 
0.083*** 
(0.009) 
GS-14 
0.186*** 
(0.010) 
0.177*** 
(0.010) 
0.103*** 
(0.011) 
0.165*** 
(0.010) 
0.104*** 
(0.031) 
0.097*** 
(0.011) 
Omitted: 0-1 Years Experience   
2-3 Years Experience - - 
0.073*** 
(0.004) 
- - - 
4-5 Years Experience - - 
0.077*** 
(0.006) 
- - - 
6-7 Years Experience - - 
0.072*** 
(0.007) 
- - - 
8-9 Years Experience - - 
0.057*** 
(0.009) 
- - - 
10-11 Years    
     Experience 
- - 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
- - - 
12-13 Years  
     Experience 
- - 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
- - - 
14+ Years Experience - - 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
- - - 
N 1158689 1158689 1158689 990940 48936 274285 
Examiner and Year  
     Fixed Effects? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Patent Office Class  
     Fixed Effects? 
NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Application Controls  
    and Technology-by- 
    Year Fixed Effects? 
NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Balanced Sample of  
    Examiners from  
    GS-7 to GS-14? 
NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Balanced Sample of  
     Examiners from  
     GS-11 to GS-14 
NO NO NO NO NO YES 
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Essential to our analysis is the separation of the effects stemming from grade-level promotions 
and from the acquisition of additional years of experience within the Agency.  Note from the 
outset that while such events naturally correlate with each other, they do not do so perfectly.  
That is, examiners do not always receive promotions lockstep with experience, allowing us to 
separately identify these forces.  This is especially true from GS-12 onwards when examiners 
begin to routinely spend multiple years (to varying degrees) at the respective grade.19  By 
including year fixed effects in a specification with examiner fixed effects, this initial 
specification is identifying the impacts of GS-level changes while accounting for the influence of 
individual examiners moving across experience levels (in year increments).  This observation 
stems from the well-known point (Heckman and Robb 1985) that age (experience) effects have 
become determined when one has estimated both year effects and cohort effects (which derive 
from individual effects).20  However, we acknowledge that this initial specification does not 
allow us to distinguish the contribution of year effects from experience effects.  In certain 
specifications estimated below, we take further steps to achieve this separation (see below).   
Examiner behavior may change over time under a range of theories.  For instance, with more 
years of experience, examiners may become better at identifying allowable subject matter.  On 
the other hand, it could be the case that examiners simply lessen their scrutiny as time goes by in 
the Patent Office due to an increased tendency to shirk.  To the extent that any such stories are 
even present in the first place—which we address more directly below—the above findings 
demonstrate a distinct jump in grant rates that occurs upon GS-level promotion independent of 
any pattern of grant rates that examiners exhibit over time itself.  Considering that the key 
 
19
  Over 75 percent of examiners who have reached the stage of GS-level 14 stay at that grade level over a year, with over 
20 percent staying for at least 8 years.  On the other hand, only 16 percent of examiners who have been at GS-level 7 stay at that 
grade beyond 1 year.   
20
  Behind this problem is the identity: calendar year = year of birth (cohort) + age.   

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channel by which the act of promotion may theoretically impact subsequent examination 
behavior stems from its effect on the time allotted for examination (as discussed above), these 
results provide greater confidence that (1) time constraints may be binding on examiners and (2) 
that tightening such constraints may leave examiners with less time to adequately challenge the 
patentability of applications.21 We further support this contention below with even richer 
methods of decoupling experience from promotions and with investigations into examiner search 
efforts and rejection patterns.  Beforehand, however, we briefly discuss the relationship that we 
nonetheless estimate between grant rates and an increase in examiner experience in years. 
2. Experience Effects 
Though our focus is mainly on examination time allocations, it would be of interest to identify 
the effects of experience independently in order to more fully evaluate the determinants of 
examiner behavior.  As above, it is not possible to distinguish year effects from annual 
experience effects in specifications that include individual examiner intercepts, absent additional 
normalization restrictions on the parameterization of the year or experience effects that break the 
identity between them.  In our primary approach to isolating the independent impacts of 
experience, we estimate specifications that achieve the necessary restrictions by specifying 
 
21
  We acknowledge that some examiners may attempt to increase their chances of promotion by granting more 
permissively as a general matter of course, either because such behavior may facilitate the processing of a greater number of 
applications or in light of the financial interests of the Agency in over-granting patents (Frakes and Wasserman 2013).  Our fixed 
effects methodology is designed to place inherent granting tendencies aside—including those stemming from promotion-seeking 
behavior—and instead focus on within-examiner changes in behaviors over the course of a career.  For a story of this nature to 
explain the results, it would have to be the case that promotion-seeking behavior elevates in intensity upon each promotion.  
Cutting against this latter theory are the drops in grant rates that we observe within particular GS levels over time, as we discuss 
below.  


examiner experience dummies into two-year blocks—i.e., 0-1 years of experience, 2-3 years of 
experience, etc.22       
In Column 3 of Table 3, we present results from this attempt to separately estimate GS-level, 
year and experience effects, where we focus on presenting the GS-level and experience dummy 
coefficients, leaving year effects as a nuisance control.  In Figure 2, we plot the estimated 
coefficients of the experience group dummies from this specification, finding an inverse-U 
relationship between examiner experience (in years) and grant rates.  Grant rates do increase by 
close to 8 percentage points as an examiner moves from 0-1 to 2-3 years of experience.  The 
grant rate effectively stays at this level through 5 years of experience and thereafter begins to 
fall, until the point at which the grant rate at 14+ years of experience is identical to the 0-1 year 
experience level.   
These U-shaped experience findings build upon Lemley and Sampat’s (2012) prior observation 
that grant rates increase monotonically with experience in years.  Lemley and Sampat 
acknowledge the possibility that the monotonic relationship they estimate does not represent a 
true experience effect at all but instead captures either the promotion-related time-allocation 
story of focus in our analysis or an alternative story of selective retention—i.e., a tenure effect in 
which those senior examiners that elect to stay at the Patent Office differ fundamentally from 
 
22
  By specifying experience groups in this manner, it is no longer the case that experience dummies would be perfectly 
collinear with year dummies as would be the case with both yearly experience group dummies and year effects.  For instance, 
consider a set of applications reviewed in 2002 by some examiners who began with the Patent Office in 1997 and others who 
began in 1996, among a much richer sample of applications covering multiple years and cohorts.  How can we attribute the 
information from these particular applications to an estimation of cohort, year and experience effects across this broader sample?  
By creating a group comprising those with 5-6 years of experience and using these observations to contribute to an estimation of 
the intercept for this group, we retain the ability to contribute information to separately identify a 1996 cohort effect and a 1997 
cohort effect.  With enough statistical power, having broken this identity, one can identify the separate influence of each such 
mechanism.  See de Ree and Alessie (2011) for a discussion as to how specifying age effects in blocks breaks the age + cohort = 
year identity.  We note that this approach is not without consequence, since we are implicitly assuming that experience effects 
follow a grouping of this nature—i.e., that 5-year experience examiners and 6-year experience examiners are alike.  We note, 
however, that our results generalize to alternative normalization restrictions, including the use of 3- or 4-year experience bins or 
to the use of a 0-1 year experience bin along with yearly experience dummies thereafter.  In each case, we continue to document 
an inverse-U pattern (results available upon request).   

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those that leave the office earlier.  Lacking data on examiner GS levels and observing only a 
cross section of applications at a point in time, Lemley and Sampat are unable to fully rule out 
these possibilities, though, they do include some examiner tenure controls to alleviate selective 
retention concerns.  Though not emphasized in their analysis, the cross-sectional sampling frame 
also leaves them unable to separate the effect of gaining experience in years—a true experience 
effect—from an examiner cohort effect, where this latter influence captures fundamental 
differences in examination behavior (perhaps due to initial training or cultural idiosyncrasies) 
among those who began their careers with the Patent Office in different calendar years.23   
By controlling for examiner GS levels and individual examiner effects, we are, unlike the prior 
literature, able to target the association between examiner experience and grant rates while 
accounting for cohort, tenure and promotion-related effects.  In the Online Appendix, we 
demonstrate that the monotonic relationship between experience and grant rates documented by 
Lemley and Sampat is likely driven by the promotion-related time-allocation effects (depicted in 
Figure 1) and by examiner cohort effects—that is, all else equal, inherent granting tendencies 
have fallen with subsequent examiner cohorts (beginning with high grant rates for those starting 
in the 1990s).  Once controlling for these other influences, experience effects themselves appear 
to follow the inverse-U shape depicted in Figure 2. 
  
 
 After all, if, for instance, one only studies applications filed in 2001 and observes that those with 8 years of experience 
have higher grant rates than those with 2 years of experience, it is difficult to determine whether that finding is attributable to the 
act of gaining 6 additional years of experience or from the fact that those who started working for the Patent Office in the early 
1990s have higher inherent granting tendencies relative to those starting in the late 1990s—e.g., due to difference in initial hiring 
conditions over such periods and due to the importance of initial conditions in developing enduring practice styles.  


Figure 2: Relationship between Examiner Experience Groups and Grant Rate, Controlling for 
GS Level 
 
Notes: this figure presents results from a regression of a dummy variable indicating a granted application on dummy 
variables representing each General Schedule level between 7 and 14, including both GS-13 with and without partial 
signatory authority, along with dummy variables representing the incidence of 8 different experience (in years) 
groups.  This figure presents the coefficients of the experience group dummies only.  The vertical bars represent 
95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients.  Regressions include examiner and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered at the examiner level.   
 
3. Within-Grade Experience Effects 
In this sub-section, we take an alternative approach to separating grade-level effects from 
experience effects.  Instead of simply estimating the overall impacts of being at the Patent Office 
for a given number of years, we nest experience years within grade levels.  In other words, we 
estimate specifications that include a series of dummy variables capturing the presence of 
specific years within specific grade levels—e.g., 0-1 years in GS-13, 2-3 years in GS-13, 0-1 
years in GS-14, 2-3 years in GS-14 etc.  This approach allows us to more comprehensively 
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follow the course of a hypothetical examiner over the various stages of a career and thus better 
visualize the independent and discontinuous impacts of examination-time-reducing promotions.  
For this analysis, we focus only on those examiners in GS-12 and above considering that the 
majority (though not all) of those within lower grade levels achieve promotions within their first 
year at those grades, providing little ability to reliably track the evolution of grant rates over 
years while at GS-7, 9 or 11.  
 
Figure 3: Relationship between Grant Rate and Increases in Experience Years within Distinct 
Grade Levels 
 
Notes: In the specification underlying this figure, we regress a dummy variable indicating a granted application on a 
series of dummy variables capturing specific experience years within each grade level, beginning at GS-level 12.  
We track examiners for 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 and 9+ years within GS level 12 and then the same within each of GS-
level 13 without signatory authority, GS-level 13 with signatory authority and, finally, GS-level 14.  Specifications 
include both examiner and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the examiner level.   
 
 
Figure 3 plots the results of this exercise, presenting the coefficients of each of these separate 
dummy variables, with the 0-1 year period at GS-12 serving as the omitted reference group.  The 
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results only further solidify the contention that examination practices change upon the 
occurrence of career events that are associated with reductions in the time allocated to 
examiners.  Upon each such promotion, the observed grant rate jumps.  Importantly, these 
promotion-level increases do not appear to be mere reflections of continuing trends in grant rates 
over the duration of an examiner’s tenure at the specific grades, which might otherwise suggest a 
simple experience-level story or which might otherwise suggest a selection story in which the 
Patent Office elects to promote examiners at points in time in which the examiners begin to grant 
at elevated rates.24  Consider, for instance, GS-level 14, a level in which examiners spend on 
average 4.5 years upon reaching.  While the grant rate jumps distinctly once one enters this GS 
level (to a degree that is 8 percentage points higher than the reference period), the grant rate 
actually begins to fall thereafter.  In the period represented by her 9th year and beyond at GS-14, 
her grant rate is over 5 percentage points below the initial GS-14 grant rate.  If the grant rate had 
incrementally continued to rise over such years, especially at levels commensurate with those 
experienced upon grade level changes, it would instill less confidence in an interpretation of the 
results as emanating from reductions in the amount of time at the disposal of examiners. 
  
 
24
  In the Online Appendix, we provide even further support against the possibility that the Patent Office elects to promote 
given examiners once their grant rates hit certain elevated points, a possibility that could otherwise explain the initial findings in 
Figure 1.  Specifically, we find that those examiners that are promoted quickly within the Agency—and whose work appears to 
be most valued by the Patent Office—actually have lower inherent grant rates relative to those who rise more slowly in the ranks.   
	

 
Figure 4: Relationship between Grant Rate and Increases in Experience Years within Distinct 
Grade Levels, Conditional on Examiner Starting at least Below GS-12 During Sample Window 
 
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 3, except that it excludes examiners that start the sample period at GS-12 
and higher (that is, it excludes those examiners whose pre-sample-period tenures within the relevant grade are 
unobservable).  Within this restricted sample, there are no observations (and thus no reported results) for examiners 
in the 4th and 5th period groups within the second GS-13 category.   
 
Indeed, if anything, this picture depicts a story in which experience (in years) alone ultimately 
corresponds to a reduction in granting tendencies, as opposed to the monotonically increasing 
relationship observed between grade levels and grant rates (further illuminating the various 
forces underlying the positive relationship found in Lemley and Sampat, 2012).  With respect to 
each of the four given promotion categories considered in Figure 3, the grant rate ultimately 
begins to fall over time as one stays within the respective category long enough.  These drops in 
grant rates with experience are periodically corrected by successive promotions of the sort that 
leave examiners with diminished examination time.  If anything, the declines in grant rates 
observed over the temporal dimension of Figure 3—that is, over the increases in years within the 
various grade levels—perhaps suggest a story in which examiners in general learn over time how 
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to form more effective bases of rejection (thus contributing to falling grant rates), only to have 
this learning process interrupted by occasional promotions that diminish the amount of time they 
have to derive such rejections (thus re-elevating grant rates). 
In discussing Figure 3, it also bears mentioning that examiners may continue to receive salary 
increases throughout their tenure at each GS-level.  The presence of such alternative types of 
promotions—that is, within-GS-level increases in salary that are tied only to experience—are 
further helpful for our analysis in providing support against an argument that the findings set 
forth in Figure 1 are attributable merely to any increases in income associated with GS-level 
promotions (if that were the case, grant rates would tend to rise throughout all of Figure 3).25      
4. Caveats 
To be sure, our identification of GS-level effects as distinct from experience effects in Figure 1 
and Table 3 is drawn from the experiences of those examiners that happen to stay within those 
GS levels for some time before being promoted.  For low GS levels, this group of examiners is 
more select.  It is unclear whether such local findings generalize to the quick risers within the 
Agency.  Nonetheless, the same pattern of grant-rate increases upon promotion is present as we 
proceed to higher and higher grade levels, where it is more common for examiners to spend 
multiple years within given GS levels, lending some confidence to a more general story.     
Similar concerns arise for the case of the within-GS-level declines in grant rates over time 
observed in Figure 3.  After all, only a small minority of examiners at GS-12 and 13 stay at those 
grades over the full course of years depicted.  Perhaps the most conservative way to interpret our 
results is that with respect to at least some examiners—that is, those that happen to achieve 
 
25
  Examiners are promoted to different “steps”—e.g., Step 1 at GS-12, Step 2 at GS-12, etc.  These step promotions 
generally transpire with increases in experience over time, as distinct from merit based promotions, and generally entail a 
meaningful increase in salary level.  For instance, a GS-level 14 at “Step 5” is paid $128,941 while a GS-level 14 at Step 10 is 
paid $147,900.   


promotions relatively more slowly—the effects of increased temporal experience on grant rates 
appears to generally be negative.  For those other examiners that experience early promotions 
more rapidly, it is difficult to say what role experience plays as distinct from GS-level changes 
during these early years.  Nonetheless, such quick risers at least stay for a long time at GS-14 at 
which point their grant rates do indeed fall with more years of experience.         
5. Sample Balance 
A related concern stems from the sample imbalance in the above specifications.  Take Figure 1 
for instance.  Though examiners in our sample experience on average nearly 4 of the 7 possible 
promotions depicted in this figure and though the relevant GS-level coefficients are identified by 
actual within-examiner changes in grade levels for at least some subset of examiners (as opposed 
to across-examiner comparisons), the underlying specification does not follow all examiners 
throughout each of the indicated grade levels.  Nonetheless, in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, we 
present results of a balanced-sample analog of Column 1/Figure 1 in which we follow a more 
select group of examiners that experience each of the indicated promotions.  The findings 
parallel those presented above.   
Figure 3 poses similar concerns insofar as some examiners are entering the sample period 
during the course of the trajectory envisioned by this figure.  In Figure 4, we arguably achieve 
better balance by estimating a similar specification but conditioning on those examiners that 
enter the sample period at least below GS-12, allowing us to observe how examiners proceed 
along the pathway inherent in Figure 3 as they enter the GS-12+ range from the outset.  In the 
Online Appendix, we present results from yet additional specifications that aim to achieve 
sample balance in tracing examiner behavior throughout the course of their careers.   


6. Other Robustness Checks and Alternative Specifications 
Covariates and Technology Effects.  We further challenge the above grant-rate results through 
a range of additional robustness exercises.  For instance, we demonstrate in Column 4 of Table 3 
that the above findings remain nearly unchanged when we include certain application-level 
controls (indicated in Section III above), along with the inclusion of technology-by-year fixed 
effects (Column 4 of Table 3).  Further, in the Online Appendix, we estimate specifications 
identical to that underlying Figure 1 separately for each of the 37 different Hall et al. (2001) 
technology sub-categories.  This exercise demonstrates that the increase in grant rates associated 
with the promotions of interest manifests itself in each of the 37 different technologies (as 
opposed to being driven by a small subset of technologies).26  As such, time constraints appear to 
be binding across the board within the Agency.   
Falsification Exercise.  In Table A9 of the Online Appendix, we conduct a falsification test in 
which we estimate the relationship between the promotions of interest and two characteristics of 
the underlying application with respect to which the examiner has no ability to alter (and with 
respect to which we have data): (1) whether or not the incoming application was previously filed 
with the EPO and JPO and (2) whether or not the applicant is a large or small entity (as such 
terms are used by the Patent Office to set application fees).  We find no meaningful or 
statistically significant changes in foreign priority rates as examiners ascend grade levels.  From 
GS-level 11 onwards, we find that the incidence of a large-entity applicant remains virtually flat 
 
 With respect to a few of those 37 groups, grant rates initially fall after the first promotion but then rise thereafter.  Of 
course, in those latter instances, the grant rates are still rising over the range where the methodology can best separate a time 
allocation effect from an experience in years effect.  Bear in mind that differences across technologies in the need for 
examination hours (because of differences in underlying levels of complexity of the art) are already reflected in the allocation 
schedules.  This fact makes it difficult to form ex ante predictions that promotion-related tightening of time constraints will have 
greater impacts in some technologies relative to others.  We also caution that little should be drawn from the observation of 
declining grant rates upon early promotions in those few instances where it is observed considering that the affected 
technologies—e.g., Drugs—are generally complex fields where the vast majority of examiners enter the affected Art Units at GS-
11 or 12. 


(with only a minor increase in this incidence as examiners move from GS-7 to GS-9 and then 
from GS-9 to GS-11).   These results lend further confidence to the contention that applications 
are randomly sorted, especially in the grade levels of most interest for our analysis (where it 
becomes easier to separate experience effects from grade-level effects).       
GS-15 Examiners. For the reasons set forth in the Online Appendix, we exclude those few 
applications examined by GS-15 examiners from the primary analysis (< 3 percent of all 
applications).  While published, official records regarding the scaling of time allotments upon 
promotions suggest that GS-15 examiners should be given even less time than GS-14 examiners 
to review applications, the examiner-level time allotment information we received from the 
Patent Office suggested that this may not be the case for many of the GS-15 examiners.  In spite 
of this discrepancy, we estimate specifications in the Online Appendix that include these GS-15-
examined applications and assume that GS-15 examiners are indeed given less time for review, 
as the official schedules suggest they should.  As demonstrated by Figures A5 and A6, we 
continue to estimate the same pattern of results with this inclusion.27   
B. Analysis of Rejection Patterns 
1. Obviousness 
A key prediction set forth above is that examiners will begin to perform fewer and fewer 
rejections based on the argument that the proposed claims are obvious—an especially time 
intensive analysis—upon the occurrence of promotions that leave them with less and less 
allocated examination time.  We now attempt to illuminate the above grant-rate findings by 
 
 The Online Appendix presents results of certain additional robustness checks, including, among others, the estimation 
of specifications that control for the incidence of a request-for-continued examination (RCE) associated with the application, 
which is a device used by applicants to continue the examination process in the face of an examiner’s final rejection. 


testing this secondary hypothesis and exploring the effects of promotions on the incidence of 
obviousness rejections among the underlying applications.    
One limitation of the data that we collected for this analysis, as novel as it is, is that we simply 
capture the incidence of any obviousness rejection without knowing the full force of such 
rejection.  Does it simply cover one claim or many claims?  Is it easy to overcome or difficult?  
Such questions cannot be adequately resolved with the data collected.  With this limitation in 
mind, we first take an approach where we do not view obviousness rejections in an absolute 
sense, but instead specify the dependent variable as the ratio of obviousness rejections to total 
rejections, more specifically the incidence of an obviousness rejection divided by the sum of the 
incidence of the following types of rejections: obviousness, lack of novelty, lack of patentable 
subject matter/utility, and failure to satisfy the disclosure requirements.  Though each of the 
variables underlying this ratio suffer from the above limitation, this measure at least provides us 
with a sense of the relative effort spent on obviousness rejections.  In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 
4, we replicate the basic specifications estimated in Table 3 but use this obviousness share 
measure as the dependent variable.  The results depict a monotonically strengthening decline in 
this obviousness rejection share upon the promotions of interest, suggesting a story in which 
examiners begin to spend less and less of their efforts on time-intensive obviousness analyses 
upon promotions that leave them with less and less time at their disposal.28   
  
 
	 Figures A10-A12 of the Online Appendix plots trends over GS-level increases in the incidence of each type of rejection 
separately, further illuminating the pattern of results presented in Column 1 of Table 4.  


TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINATION SCRUTINY METRICS AND GRADE AND 
EXPERIENCE LEVELS OF ASSOCIATED EXAMINERS 
    
     
 
SHARE OF REJECTIONS BASED 
ON OBVIOUSNESS 
SHARE OF PRIOR ART 
CITATIONS FROM EXAMINER 
     
Omitted: GS-7     
GS-9 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
GS-11 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
GS-12 
-0.024*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.027*** 
(0.007) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
GS-13 
-0.028*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.038*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.008) 
GS-13 (with partial signatory 
authority) 
-0.035*** 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.005) 
-0.048*** 
(0.008) 
-0.018** 
(0.008) 
GS-14 
-0.050*** 
(0.005) 
-0.046*** 
(0.006) 
-0.051*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
     
Omitted: 0-1 Years Experience     
2-3 Years Experience - 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
- 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
4-5 Years Experience - 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
- 
-0.035*** 
(0.005) 
6-7 Years Experience - 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
- 
-0.045*** 
(0.007) 
8-9 Years Experience - 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
- 
-0.043*** 
(0.008) 
10-11 Years    
     Experience 
- 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
- 
-0.039*** 
(0.010) 
12-13 Years  
     Experience 
- 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
- 
-0.034*** 
(0.011) 
14+ Years Experience - 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
N 884857 884857 643838 643838 
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Figure 5: Relationship between Share of Rejections based on Obviousness and Increases in 
Experience Years within Distinct Grade Levels
 
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 3 except that it replaces the incidence of an application being granted with 
the share of rejections for the application constituting an obviousness rejection as the dependent variable. 
 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between Incidence of any Obviousness Rejection and Increases in 
Experience Years within Distinct Grade Levels 
 
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 3 except that it replaces the incidence of an application being granted with 
the incidence of an application experiencig an obviousness rejection as the dependent variable. 
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In Figure 5, we follow the approach of Figure 3 and track how the share of obviousness 
rejections evolves as an examiner increases in tenure over time within particular grades.  
Complementing the observation in Figure 3 of jumps in grant rates upon promotions, we observe 
corresponding drops at such moments in obviousness rejection efforts.  Further complementing 
Figure 3, which demonstrates a general trend to decrease grant rates over time within given grade 
levels, Figure 5 likewise demonstrates a corresponding tendency over the time dimension to 
increase the share of obviousness rejections. As before, this may be consistent with a learning 
story in which examiners get better and better at forming obviousness determinations over time.  
Periodically, however, examiners will experience promotions that cut short the time they have to 
make such rejections, at which moments, the rates by which they are able to form obviousness 
rejections fall back down.  We note that examiners may experience a learning curve with respect 
to other types of rejections as well (e.g., novelty).  The obviousness share measure employed in 
Figure 5 effectively normalizes the analysis by any such general rejection-learning trends, 
focusing instead on the relative degree of obviousness scrutiny.  In Figure 6, we attempt to 
explore this learning-disruption story in a more absolute sense and replace the obviousness 
rejection share as the dependent variable with the incidence of any obviousness rejection itself.  
The results depict an even starker increase in rejection behavior over time followed by large 
drops upon examination-time-reducing promotions. 
2. Implications of Obviousness Analysis for Grant-Rate Findings 
As discussed in Section I, once an examiner reaches the second GS-13 classification and GS-
level 14, she attains more authority of her own to sign off on decisions, thus representing a 
decline in the level of scrutiny placed on her by her superiors.  One may be concerned that the 
increase in grant rates observed upon promotion in Figure 1 are merely a reflection of this 


lightening of scrutiny.  The fact that this pattern of increasing granting tendencies occurs over 
earlier promotions, which do not come with the formal extension of greater authority and less 
oversight, lends support to the idea that the documented pattern of results may not simply arise 
from changes in the degree of oversight.  We acknowledge, however, the possibility of informal 
lightening of scrutiny as examiners are promoted at earlier grades.  That is, supervisors may 
lessen the extent they review an examiner’s work as she gets promoted from GS-7 through GS-
13, even though there is no formal policy by the Patent Office to do so.  If this occurs, our results 
would still hold but their interpretation would differ.  Examiners may grant more patents upon 
promotion not because they become more time constrained but instead because the work is 
subject to less review, enabling examiners to increasingly shirk their responsibilities.   
Nevertheless, one may take our findings as being more consistent with increasing time 
constraints rather than a lightening of scrutiny for several reasons.  First, as implied by Table 4 
and Figure 5 and as shown more explicitly by Figures A10-A12 in the Online Appendix, we find 
that the basis of rejection that falls the most upon grade-level changes—both in terms of 
consistency and magnitude—relates to the obviousness of the application.  In other words, the 
reductions in rejections that may correspond to the observed increase in application allowances 
are those that are most sensitive to the amount of time allocated to examiners.  With respect to 
the other rejection types—i.e., § 101 rejections (utility/patentable subject matter), § 112 
rejections (written description/enablement/definiteness) and § 102 rejections (novelty)—we 
actually do not observe a decline in grant rates upon the promotions of interest at all (only a 
leveling out).  Ultimately, if examiners are truly shirking work upon promotion, it is less clear 
why obviousness rejections would receive the emphasis of their reduced attention.  The observed 
pattern is arguably more consistent with time-management developments.   
	

Second, consider our results in Figure 3 and 4, which suggest that an examiner’s grant rate 
initially increases upon promotion and then falls with each additional year an examiner spends at 
the grade level in question.  If these findings were driven by a lightening of informal scrutiny, 
supervisors would arguably have to lessen their review of an examiner’s work immediately upon 
promotion but then slowly increase their review as the examiner garners more experience within 
a particular grade level.  This is perhaps less plausible than the binding time constraint 
explanation—i.e., an examiner’s grant rate increase upon promotion and then gradually 
decreases as she learns to adjust to her new time allocation.   
C. Investigation of Prior Art Citations 
To further illuminate whether the above patterns of rising grant rates and falling obviousness 
rejections upon the relevant promotions are indeed a reflection of reduced examination effort 
stemming from binding examination-time constraints, we next estimate the relationship between 
GS-level promotions and the share of total prior-art citations listed in the final patent that are 
provided by the examiner as opposed to the applicant, a proxy (even if crude) for the search 
effort of the examiner.  In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we estimate this relationship over the full 
sample of patents issued between 2002 and 2012.  This specification is, of course, somewhat 
compromised by the fact that it relies only on issued patents, the incidence of which we already 
know (as above) is likely to increase upon the promotions of interest, leading to possible 
selection concerns.  With this caveat in mind, we note that the findings parallel those of the 
obviousness-rejection analysis above.   
  



TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALLOWANCE RATE AT EPO AND JPO AND U.S. EXAMINER 
GRADE AND EXPERIENCE LEVELS, AMONG SET OF U.S. PATENTS LIKEWISE SEEKING 
PROTECTION AT EPO AND JPO 
   
    
 
INCIDENCE OF 
ALLOWANCE 
AT BOTH EPO 
AND JPO 
INCIDENCE OF 
ALLOWANCE 
AT EPO 
INCIDENCE OF 
ALLOWANCE 
AT JPO 
Omitted: GS-7    
GS-9 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
GS-11 
-0.048*** 
(0.019) 
-0.048*** 
(0.018) 
-0.031* 
(0.017) 
GS-12 
-0.056*** 
(0.019) 
-0.057*** 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.018) 
GS-13 
-0.063*** 
(0.020) 
-0.059*** 
(0.019) 
-0.042** 
(0.019) 
GS-13 (with partial signatory authority) 
-0.065*** 
(0.020) 
-0.061*** 
(0.020) 
-0.040** 
(0.020) 
GS-14 
-0.070*** 
(0.021) 
-0.063*** 
(0.020) 
-0.048** 
(0.02) 
    
Omitted: 0-1 Years Experience    
2-3 Years Experience 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.029** 
(0.009) 
4-5 Years Experience 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
6-7 Years Experience 
0.024 
(0.016) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
0.034** 
(0.015) 
8-9 Years Experience 
0.025 
(0.020) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
0.037** 
(0.019) 
10-11 Years    
     Experience 
0.029 
(0.024) 
0.024 
(0.023) 
0.039* 
(0.023) 
12-13 Years  
     Experience 
0.029 
(0.028) 
0.023 
(0.027) 
0.041 
(0.026) 
14+ Years Experience 
0.016 
(0.034) 
0.022 
(0.032) 
0.023 
(0.033) 
N 172103 172103 172103 
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D. Assessment of Marginal Nature of Increased Grants 
The analysis above suggests that, as time constraints tighten, examiners will grant some 
patents that they might have otherwise rejected if given sufficient time.  Assuming an otherwise 
competent examination process, these additional patent grants should be of marginally 
questionable validity—i.e., they should fail to satisfy a proper application of patentability 
standards.  It is inherently difficult to systematically assess the underlying legal validity of each 
of the patents issued in our sample.  Nonetheless, to test this prediction, we rely upon the fact 
that many U.S. applicants likewise file for patent protection with the European Patent Office 
(EPO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO), two offices that are known to invest substantially more 
resources per application in the examination process, while having essentially similar 
patentability standards (Picard and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011).  Accordingly, we 
consider the sample of issued patents in which the relevant U.S. applicant likewise sought 
protection at the EPO and the JPO and follow Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Lemley and Sampat 
(2012) in using outcomes at these foreign offices as a benchmark—albeit an imperfect one—to 
assess what the outcome at the U.S. Patent Office would have been (at least generally speaking) 
if the U.S. examiners were to be given more time and resources to determine the patentability of 
the relevant invention.       
For these purposes, we note that it is not possible to pinpoint the exact marginal patents that 
are issued as a result of binding time constraints.  Nonetheless, with the above (admittedly, 
rough) proxy for validity in mind, one can arguably identify the quality of such marginal patents 
by looking at the full sample of patents that were issued in the U.S. and that sought protection in 
the EPO and the JPO and then estimating how the mean incidence of such patents likewise being 

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granted by the EPO (and/or JPO) changes as examiners experience the examination-time-
reducing promotions of interest.  The above analysis demonstrated that the pool of issued patents 
will rise upon such promotions.  To the extent that average quality levels among the set of issued 
patents fall upon these events, it must be the case that the marginal patents being issued as a 
result of these promotions are of an increasingly below-average level of quality (Frakes 2013).29  
In Table 5, we test for the presence of falling mean rates upon promotion for the indicated 
patent quality metric.  Consistent with expectations, we indeed estimate monotonically 
(generally) declining patterns of this nature, suggestive of marginal patent issuances of 
weakening validity.  Relative to the patents issued at GS-7, the patents issued at GS-14 are 7 
percentage-points—or roughly 16 percent—less likely to be allowed by both the EPO and the 
JPO (when using success at both foreign offices to signify the strongest benchmark of quality).  
Whether or not those additional patent grants arising from such promotions have truly crossed 
the invalidity threshold, the evidence suggests that they are at least of a more questionable nature 
than the typical issuance.     
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A. Summary and Magnitude of Findings  
Our analysis finds that as examiners are given less time to review applications upon certain 
types of promotions, the less prior art they cite, the less likely they are to make time-consuming 
obviousness rejections, and the more likely they are to grant patents.  Moreover, our evidence 
suggests that these marginally issued patents are of weaker-than-average quality.  These findings 
demonstrate that a factor other than the true patentability of applications may be a determinant of 
granting decisions and may be pushing grant rates upwards.  All else equal, they thus support the 
 

 After all, if one adds some object to an existing set of objects and the average value of the overall set of objects falls, it 
must be case that the object added on the margin is of below-average value.  

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general sentiment that the Patent Office may be biased towards allowing patents.  Of course, all 
else is not necessarily equal and we cannot say definitively that the net effect of all features of 
the Patent Office pushes in this direction.  Nonetheless, we stress that the feature that we do 
emphasize in this analysis is one that may meaningfully alter the granting landscape of the 
Agency.  Combining the estimated impacts of GS-level changes on grant rates depicted in 
Column 1 of Table 3 with the distribution of applications examined across the various grade 
levels, as depicted in Column 1 of Table A1 in the Online Appendix, our analysis implies that if 
all examiners were allocated as many hours as are extended to GS-7 examiners, the Patent 
Office’s overall grant rate would fall by roughly 14 percentage points, or nearly 20 percent.30  
Based on the number of annual disposals by the patent office in recent years, this would amount 
to approximately 40,000-45,000 fewer issued patents per year.   
To facilitate an alternative interpretation of the magnitude of the above findings, Table A7 in 
the Online Appendix presents results from an examiner fixed effects specification that likewise 
draws upon promotion-related changes in time allocations but that replaces the grade level 
dummy variables with a single variable for the number of hours allocated to the application at 
hand (and that includes Patent Office class dummies to account for fixed differences in hour 
allotments across classes).  This exercise suggests that a doubling of the amount of hours given 
to all examiners is associated with a 9 to 24 percentage point (or a 13 to 34 percent) reduction in 
the grant rate, representing roughly 40,000-100,000 fewer patents being issued each year.   
B. Quality / Production Tradeoff  
 
30
  For example, roughly 35 percent of applications are disposed of by GS-14 examiners, whom we have estimated to grant 
at a nearly 19 percentage-point (or 28 percent) higher rate than GS-7 examiners, accounting fully for examiner heterogeneity.  
This implies that if, those applications disposed of by GS-14 examiners were granted at the same rate applied by GS-7 examiners, 
the Agency would experience a reduction in its grant rate of roughly 7 percentage points (=0.19*0.35) or by roughly 10 percent 
(0.28*0.35).  Extending this exercise to the remaining grades and aggregating the amounts delivers the indicated 20 percent 
effect. 
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1. Basic Framework 
Of course, increasing the number of hours allotted to examiners in such a manner would not be 
without consequence.  To understand the tradeoffs at play here, consider a Patent Office with the 
following objective function:  
!	7∑ #$	
%
	& ,'	 (	)	*
+	
where xt is the number of applications processed by the Agency at time t, gt is the rate by which 
the Agency grants applications at time t and )	 is the rate by which the Agency would grant 
applications if given sufficient time to properly follow the patentability standards.  First, we 
assume that V’(xt) > 0—i.e.,  that the Patent Office’s utility is enhanced the greater it is able to 
satisfy its obligation to process incoming applications.  It could of course decline to satisfy all 
such obligations immediately and review some applications at a later date; however, pursuant to 
the above objective function, the Patent Office will discount a delayed review (*+	.  That is, we 
assume that the Agency values a timely review of all incoming applications.  Long patent delays, 
after all, can postpone the deployment of valuable inventions to the marketplace and increase 
uncertainty surrounding the rights of potential patents, which in turn limit a company’s ability to 
license or engage in related activity.  Moreover, to the extent future inventions are based on prior 
ones, a backlog of patent applications may deter cumulative innovation.31 
As theorized above (and as supported by the empirical analysis), '	 (	)	 increases as the time 
allocated to review an individual application in year t, at, decreases.  In other words, time 
constraints lead to a bias in the Patent Office’s granting practices.32  Moreover, we assume that 
the Agency disvalues the presence of any such bias—i.e., V’('	 (	)	) < 0.  As stated in our 
 
 Based on these costs, one study has estimated that an additional year of patent pendency could cost the global economy 
close to 12 billion dollars (London Economics 2010).
 In light of our focus in this paper on determinants of a pro-granting bias and in light of our theoretical predictions of 
such a bias, we only consider the situation where '	 ,	)	—that is, where grant rates may be set higher than the unbiased rate.   
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introductory remarks, the granting of invalid patents on the margin may stunt follow-on 
innovation and impose related harms on society.   
Finally, it is critical to note that the Patent Office will maximize this objective function subject 
to a resource constraint that must be satisfied at each time period (according to a fixed budget, 
R): 	 ≥ athtxt- ./, where ht equals the cost per hour of examination time to the Agency.  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate whether the Agency is properly optimizing its 
constrained objectives with its choice over how many hours to allocate to each individual 
application; rather, we simply set forth this structure in order to demonstrate the trade-offs 
associated with this choice.  The Patent Office may increase the amount of time, a, allocated to 
review given applications in an attempt to reduce its grant bias—i.e., bring gt closer to )	—and 
thereby increase its utility, V.  However, to the extent that the budget constraint binds (and in 
light of the fixed R), it can be readily shown that an increase in a in period t must come at the 
expense of a reduction in the amount of applications processed in period t, x, a development that 
would, in turn, inhibit the objectives of the Patent Office and result in the above specified harms 
associated with delayed examinations.33   
As such, the Agency’s choice over how many hours to extend to examiners implicates a 
possible tradeoff between the benefits of improved patent quality and the harms of reduced 
examination capacity.  Our empirical analysis suggests that the above specified budget constraint 
may indeed be binding and that this tradeoff is presently in action.  However, the above analysis 
does not necessarily demonstrate that the way in which the Patent Office executes this tradeoff is 
suboptimal given its budgetary limitations.  Of course, to the extent that the Agency overly 
favors examination capacity concerns in performing this calculus (beyond the weight that may be 
applied to such concerns by a social planner), which is possible given that application throughput 
 
 In the case of a binding budget constraint, $	 = Rt/(atht), in which case d(xt)/d(at) < 0.  

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(and associated backlog) is a more highly visible and easily measured feature of the Agency 
relative to the quality of its review (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), the Patent Office’s 
execution of this tradeoff may indeed deviate from optimality—i.e., it may be setting 
examination time allotments insufficiently low.34  
2. Examiner Heterogeneity in Productivity 
Figure 3 suggests that examiners may undergo productivity gains as they accumulate 
experience over time within the Patent Office.  That is, for a given time allotment, a, examiners 
may be able to bring gt closer to )	 as they spend more time at the Agency.  With these gains in 
mind, the Agency may desire to set different time allocations for examiners with different levels 
of productivity (e.g., provide less time to examiners with experience).35  The above framework 
can be readily extended to account for examiner heterogeneity along such lines, such that the 
Patent Office will maximize  
!	 = ∑ ∑ #$	0
%
	& - '	0 (	)	*
+	
0 ; 
s.t. 
	 ≥ ∑ 1	0$	02	00 - ./ 
where m signifies different productivity groups.  In the unitary examiner framework set forth 
above, increases in application throughput, x, could only come at the expense of driving grant 
rates above their unbiased point, ) (i.e., at the expense of quality), when constraints bind.  If all 
examiners experienced productivity gains, one might expect to observe a relaxation of the budget 
 
 In its own annual reports, the Patent Office’s rhetoric suggests an especially strong emphasis on promoting examination 
throughput.  In its 2008 Performance and Accountability Report, the Patent Office stated that its “biggest challenge” is to 
decrease its patent pendency (the time between the filing of an application and the receipt of a substantive communication from 
the Agency) and to decrease the backlog of applications awaiting review (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2008).  
Moreover, the Office of Inspector General recently issued a report concluding that the Patent Office’s policies in place to review 
the quality of patent examiner decisions were largely ineffective.  (Office of Inspector General, 2015).     
 While the Patent Office does not necessarily make such adjustments over years of experience itself, they do, as 
discussed above, time-allocation adjustments upon certain specified promotions.


constraint and a resulting first order condition in which examination quality is marginally less 
compromised—i.e., a reduction in grant rates.  If only some examiners experience productivity 
gains, the Patent Office may experience similar relief and set time allocations such that its 
overall grant rate goes down.  However, without knowing more about the structure of the Patent 
Office’s objective function, it is difficult to predict how any such desired quality improvements 
will be split among the different productivity types.  For instance, to the extent the Agency 
places significant value on horizontal application equity, it may try to adjust time allotments in a 
way that still leaves '	0 (	)	 similar across different examiner types, m—i.e., in a way that 
leaves an applicant’s outcome unaffected by the examiner she randomly receives.   
We leave it for future research to assess the optimality of the particular relationship between 
examination time-allocation adjustments and grant rates that we observe in Figure 1.  
Nonetheless, we emphasize that the relationship we do observe is, interestingly, one in which 
grant rates increase strongly as examiners experience time-allocation adjustments associated 
with productivity gains.  To the extent that the solution to this maximization problem is one in 
which grant rates are either expected to fall with time-allocation adjustments upon seniority or 
stay roughly flat—which, again, might be desirable in the event that we place sufficient value on 
horizontal equity—these results would suggest that the present examination time schedule is not 
calibrated optimally (or equitably) to reflect actual productivity improvements.36 
C. Ex-Ante / Ex-Post Investment in Quality 
One feature of the patent system arguably missing from the framework set forth above is the 
judiciary.  If examiners are given less time, a, to review applications, examiners may begin to 
issue legally invalid patents on the margin (pushing g above ).  As above, this may benefit 
 
36
  Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern (2003) and Lemley and Sampat (2012) each suggested that the findings of substantial 
examination heterogeneity raised concerns over the equity of the examination process, suggesting than an applicant’s outcome 
with the process comes down to a luck of the draw with respect to which examiner she is randomly assigned.   
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welfare to the extent it allows the Agency to process more applications on a limited budget; but it 
may be detrimental to the extent it results in the issuance of invalid patents.  However, the 
welfare losses associated with such issuances may not be as large as originally envisioned to the 
extent the courts may subsequently correct this outcome and invalidate these patents (albeit with 
a delay).  Of course, this legal backdrop is not without welfare consequences of its own.  
Litigation, when it arises, carries substantial administrative expenses, lawyer fees, and related 
costs.   
As such, given that both the Patent Office and the courts assess the patentability of claimed 
inventions, the tradeoffs at play here take on yet another dimension: the balance in society’s 
utilization of these two institutions to apply the patentability standards.  Any such analysis will 
likely involve an assessment of the relative administrative expenses associated with these 
separate systems.  Though far more expensive on a per-unit basis, litigation ultimately arises in 
the case of a small fraction of those applications before the Patent Office.  Consider the decision 
to increase the amount of examination time given to examiners.  Though carrying added payroll 
expenses, this policy decision may decrease the number of invalid patents that the Agency issues 
and potentially reduce the number of lawsuits moving forward (and associated litigation 
expenses). Making particular assumptions about the various parameters in play with this 
analysis—e.g., the costs of litigation, the costs of examination, the frequency of litigation, etc.—
Lemley (2001) suggests that increasing the hours to review applications may not be cost 
effective.  The present analysis affords us an opportunity to revisit Lemley’s claim.  In the 
Online Appendix, we apply certain conservative assumptions and perform a back-of-the-
envelope calculation—supported by novel estimates of the reduction in legal challenges that may 
result from increasing examination hours—demonstrating that the savings in future litigation 
	
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costs associated with giving all examiners the amount of time given to GS-7 examiners more 
than outweigh the added payroll expenses to the Patent Office.   
At the least, this exercise supports the relevance of the Patent Office in this larger welfare 
calculus.  That is, the presence of the courts and the fact that they are invoked in rare and 
important cases may not render inconsequential the decision as to how many examination hours 
to extend to patent examiners.   
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ONLINE APPENDIX TO 
IS THE TIME ALLOCATED TO REVIEW PATENT 
APPLICATIONS INDUCING EXAMINERS TO GRANT 
INVALID PATENTS?: EVIDENCE FROM MICRO-LEVEL 
APPLICATION DATA 
 
A. Background on Patent Examiner Workload Expectations 
Examiners  are  generally  expected  to meet  certain workload  goals, whereby  they  are 
expected to attain a certain number of credits, often referred to as “counts”.   Credits, 
however, have historically been earned only upon  the  issuance of a  first office action 
and at final disposal, which occurs when a patent application is allowed by the examiner 
or abandoned by the applicant (often after receipt of a final rejection or in anticipation 
of such a rejection).1  By setting expectations regarding the number of credits examiners 
should  attain,  the  Patent  Office  contemporaneously  sets  expectations  regarding  the 
amount  of  time  examiners  should  spend  on  applications.2    The  number  of  expected 
hours allocated to review a patent application depends on both the technological field 
in which the examiner  is working and on her position  in the general schedule (GS) pay 
scale.  A patent examiner in a more complex field is allocated more hours to review an 
application than an examiner of the same grade who is working in a less complex field.  
                                                            
1  Since 2010 examiners can also earn partial credits for final office actions and examiner-initiated 
interviews with the patent applicant or her attorney.  Under either system, a patent examiner earns a 
maximum of two credits per patent application examined.  While examiners are free to average these time 
allotments over their caseload, they are strongly encouraged to meet their credit quota on a biweekly basis.  
Examiner’s performance appraisal plan (PAP) was also modified in 2010 in order to better align patent 
examiner incentives with those of the agency.  These modifications were largely uniform across examiner 
pay grade, with the exception of SPEs (GS-15) who PAP changes differed from those of GS-5 through GS-14 
patent examiners.   
2  These time allotments have largely remained unchanged since 1976.  The Patent Office has created 
new patent classifications as a result of new and emerging technology.  Once the Agency has set the time 
allotments for a new technology these allocations also have largely remained unchanged.  In 2010, however, 
the Patent Office increased the time allotments for every application by two hours.   
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The higher the pay grade of an examiner within a technology area the fewer number of 
hours the Patent Office allocates to earn two credited work units.   
 
B. Background on Collection of Rejection Types in USPTO PAIR Data 
Through reading of a number of office actions  in the PTO PAIR data, we  identified the 
following phrases that were either (1) likely to be associated with the examiner rejecting 
a claim as failing to meet the patentability standards, (2) likely to be associated with the 
examiner objecting  to  the  form of  the  claim  (as distinguished  from  its  substance),  (3) 
likely to be associated with an examiner objecting to other aspect of the application or 
making additional requirements of the patentee (e.g., objection to drawings, objection 
to  the abstract,  restriction  requirement, etc.).   To be  clear,  the  focus of  this article  is 
claim  rejections not objections.   However,  for  completeness we  reproduce  the  list of 
phrases we searched, including phrases that are directed only at identifying objections, 
below.   
rejected  under;  rejected  are  under;  rejected  as  unpatentable;  as  being 
unpatentable;  rejected  as  failing  to  define;  objected  to;  election  of  species; 
fails to define a statutory; antecedent basis; new title  is required; title of the 
application will; notice to comply; part of paper; prior art made of record and; 
rejected as being based;  rejected as being directed;  rejected on  the ground; 
restriction to one of the fol; restriction is required under; status identifiers; fail 
to meet;  fail  to comply;  fail  to contain;  fail  to provide;  fail  to  identify;  fail  to 
include;  do  not  comply  with;  not  in  accordance  with;  cannot  be  patented; 
defective because; non‐compliant because; renders the claim indefinite; not of 
sufficient quality; filed after the issue fee was; filed after publication; drawings 
in compliance with; declaration  is missing; are not consistent;  is not a proper 
submission;  not  include  a  support;  claim  rejections;  this  is  a  provisional 
obvious; because  it  is unsigned; not  filed a certified copy;  is non‐responsive; 
required  to  furnish;  introduce new matter; not contain a concise explan;  the 
following  omission;  request  for  information;  requirement  for  information; 
abstract  exceeds  150  words;  elect  a  single  disclosed  spec;  elect  disclosed 
species; not properly annotated; not signed by an; not authorized to sign; not 
been submitted; not appear to be relevant to; non‐elected subject matter  in; 
terminal  disclaimer needs  to;  associate poa  are no  longer;  include  common 
ownership  as;  other  copending  United  States;  application  conflict  with  cla; 
contain  every  element  of  cla;  believed  to  interfere;  has  not  been met;  not 
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indicated  the  appropria;  contain(s)  every  element  of;  claimed  invention  is 
differe; contains every element of cl; declaration  in compliance wi; does not 
have publication da; do not have corresponding pa; filed well after the applica; 
list of all patents. Publica; notice of non‐compliant amen; reference relevant to 
the ex; required information for the; requires that the summary of; restriction 
is hereby require; the appropriate statement ac; Website is not considered a.   
 
After compiling this  list of phrases we then searched for approximate matches to each 
of  the  above  listed  phrases  in  office  actions.  Once  such  a  match  was  identified  we 
captured  (or excerpted)  the matched phrase and a  small amount of  surrounding  text 
(approximately the sentence that contained the phrase).  After this list of excerpts was 
compiled, we wrote a simple program that allowed us to perform an iterative procedure 
to match an excerpt containing a phrase  listed above to a specific rejection  type  (e.g., 
101, 102, 103, etc.) or objection type (e.g., 37 C.F.R. 1.121(d)).   The program began by 
displaying all excerpts containing a phrase  listed above that had not yet been assigned 
to a  rejection or objection  type.   By  inspection of  this  list, we  choose a  string of  text 
(e.g., “35 USC 103”) appearing in at least one excerpt that ought to be associated with a 
particular rejection type (e.g., obviousness).   We then  identified all excerpts containing 
an exact match of  the  string of  text  that also  contained a match  to  the  same phrase 
listed above and assign each of them to the identified rejection or objection type.  That 
is, each time we matched rejection or objection type to an excerpt we did so for only for 
that group of excerpts containing the same above‐listed phrase (e.g., “rejected under,” 
“rejected  are  under,”  etc.).   We  continued  this  iterative  process  until  there were  no 
more unassigned excerpts.     
B.  Supplementary Notes Regard Data Collection 
Our sample  includes all 1,956,493 utility applications that were filed on or after March 
2001 and were published  in  the PAIR database by  July 2012.3   By  the end of 2012, 49 
                                                            
3  In November 2000, there was a change in the law that required newly filed patent applications to be 
published 18 months after they were filed.  35 U.S.C. § 122(b).  Applicants abandoned within the first 18 
months of filing, Id. § 122(b)(2)(A)(i) and applications wherein the applicant filed a special exemption to 
maintain confidentiality are exempted from this requirement, Id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i).  Such applications are 
thus absent from the PAIR database.  When some or all of an applicant’s claims are not allowed by the Patent 
Office, the aggrieved party will sometimes file a continuation application.  This application is given a new 
serial number and may be assigned to a different examiner.  Continuation applications are treated as unique 
applications in the PAIR database.  A related and now far more commonly used device, known as a Request 
for a Continued Examination (RCE), does not receive a new application serial number and effectively allows 
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percent of  these  applications had  resulted  in  patents,  25 percent were not  patented 
because  they  had  been  abandoned  by  the  applicant,4  and  the  remainder  were  still 
pending.   Applicants may elect  to abandon their applications when they are unable to 
overcome  an  examiner’s  rejection  or  for  other  business‐related  reasons.    Our  study 
focuses on  the 1.4 million utility applications  filed  from 2001 onwards  that  received a 
final disposition—those that were granted of abandoned—by July, 2012.   
Critical to our analysis is determining the experience (in years) and the GS‐level for each 
of the 9,000 examiners represented  in our sample.   For these purposes, we match the 
examiner field in the PAIR data with the two sets of examiner rosters received pursuant 
to separate FOIA requests. In order to calculate the relevant examiner’s experience, we 
take the difference between the year at the time of disposal of the application and the 
first year at which  the examiner  joined  the Patent Office, as determined by observing 
when  each  examiner was  first  represented  in  annual  examiner  lists  that we  received 
from the Patent Office.  To ensure that this approach accurately captures the experience 
of  long‐tenure  examiners, we  began  collecting  these  annual  rosters  in  1992—that  is, 
nearly  ten  years  prior  to  the  commencement  of  our  sample  period.    Naturally,  this 
cannot  ensure  complete  precision  in  the  experience  assignment  given  that  some 
examiners may have  joined  the Patent Office  long before 1992  (making  it difficult  to 
distinguish  between  10‐year  examiners  and  20‐year  examiners  for  those  applications 
disposed of  in 2002).   To alleviate these  final censoring concerns, we simply  focus the 
empirical  analysis  on  those  examiners  who  joined  the  Office  in  1993  and  beyond, 
though  the  results  are  entirely  robust  to  disregarding  this  restriction  (available  upon 
request).   On  average,  this  restricted  set  of  examiners  stays  at  the  Patent Office  for 
roughly 6.8 years with roughly 25 percent of such examiners staying at least 10 years.  
Pursuant to a second FOIA request, we received an additional set of annual rosters from 
2001 to 2012 indicating the GS level associated with each examiner on staff over those 
years.  Furthermore, a third and final FOIA request allowed us to determine whether GS‐
                                                                                                                                                                  
an aggrieved applicant to keep the application on the examiner’s docket for further prosecution.  RCEs are 
not treated as new, unique filings in the PAIR database; rather, they are treated as a continuation in the 
prosecution of original applications.   
4  A small portion of these applications were actually abandoned after being allowed by the 
examiner.   
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13 examiners did or did not have partial signatory authority at that time, a distinction, as 
above, that bears on the hours allocated to the examiner for review. 5   
The examiner  field  in PAIR had a number of typographical errors and variations  in the 
spelling or formatting of names, complicating efforts to perform the above matches.   To 
overcome  this  difficulty,  we  utilized  the  reclink  Stata  module,  a  “fuzzy”  matching 
program  designed  to  deal with  variations  in  names  over  time  (e.g.,  inclusions  of  full 
middle  names  versus  middle  initials,  name  changes  upon  marriage,  etc.).    Having 
performed  this match, we  then ensured  the creation of a stable  set of examiner  field 
effects.  All told, our analytical file contained roughly 9,000 examiners.   
In Columns 1 of Table A1, we set forth the percentage of applications in our sample that 
are disposed of by examiners  in each of the relevant GS‐levels and experience groups.  
Examiners  spend  considerably more  time  in  higher GS  ranges,  especially GS‐level  14, 
thus accounting for the higher percentage of applications associated with high GS‐level 
examiners.   Also contributing to the relatively weaker presence of GS‐levels 7 and 9  in 
the data is the fact that many examiners (nearly 1/3 of new examiners) begin at GS‐level 
11.    In Column 2, we  further  illuminate  this breakdown by  taking all of  the examiner 
rosters  over  the  2002–2012  period  and  indicating  what  percentage  of  these  total 
examiner years were represented by examiners  in the various GS‐level and experience 
categories.    For  the  reasons  just  discussed,  this  representation  also  tends  to  be 
weighted near the higher GS ranges. 
Finally,  we  exclude  those  few  applications—roughly  3  percent  of  the  raw  sample—
examined by individuals at GS‐15 given uncertainty over the examination time allocated 
to those reaching this  final,  largely supervisory  level  from our sample.   Published time 
allocation schedules suggest  that GS‐15 examiners  should  receive 67 or 71 percent of 
the  time extended  to  their GS‐12 counterparts.   However,  the  specific  time allocation 
amounts that we received from the PTO for each GS‐15 examiner  in our sample differ 
markedly  and  erratically  from  this  generally  published  schedule.6    In  any  event,  as 
                                                            
5 There were slight inconsistencies in the treatment of within-year promotions between the 
examiner roster data employed above and the secondary roster of GS-13 examiners we received 
pursuant to our second FOIA request.  That is, many of those examiners receiving this within-GS-
13 promotion were registered as doing so during the year in which our primary roster indicated 
that they ascended to GS-level 14.  We give priority to the timings of promotions set forth in this 
secondary data source.   
6  Hoping that the difference in time allotments to GS-15 examiners would provide another 
within-GS-level degree of variation, we filed an additional FOIA request with the PTO asking for 
the specific examination-time allotments associated with each GS-15 examiner, for each year from 
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demonstrated  by  this  Online  Appendix,  our  results  are  robust  to  likewise  tracking 
changes in grant rates upon the ascension to GS‐15.   
 
TABLE A1: REPRESENTATION OF GS-LEVEL AND EXPERIENCE GROUPS 
 (1) (2) 
GS-level & Experience 
Group 
Percentage of Applications 
Disposed of by Examiner in 
Indicated Group (%) 
Percentage of Total 
Examiner Years 
Spent in Indicated 
Group Between 
2002 and 2012 (%) 
GS-7 1.8 5.0 
GS-9 5.7 9.9 
GS-11 9.9 12.2 
GS-12 15.4 15.2 
GS-13 19.7 17.2 
GS-13, partial signatory 13.5 10.3 
GS-14 33.9 30.2 
0-1 Years 10.5 19.8 
2-3 Years 18.8 19.2 
4-5 Years 20.0 15.8 
6-7 Years 16.2 11.6 
8-9 Years 13.4 7.6 
10-11 Years 10.2 8.5 
12-13 Years 6.4 6.7 
14+ Years 4.2 10.8 
 
 
On a  final note, we exclude 2001  from our analytical sample, since  the PAIR database 
only began collecting application data for filings commencing in March of 2001, leaving 
very few final dispositions of such applications in 2001 and thus leaving us with a weak 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2002-2012.  The provided data, however, list the majority of such GS-15 examiners as having the 
same amount of time allocated to GS-12 and GS-13 examiners, as opposed to the anticipated 67 
percent and 71 percent values.  In the Online Appendix, we estimate specifications that treat all 
GS-15 examiners alike under the assumption, as expected from their published schedule, that GS-
15 examiners would receive even less time than their GS-14 counterparts.  However, the 
uncertainties in the data received pursuant to this final FOIA request leaves us inclined to treat this 
as a supplementary exercise only.     
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ability  to assess  the determinants of granting decisions at  such  time  (after all, patent 
prosecution durations are generally longer than a year).   Similarly, we note that only 0.2 
percent of the original sample were examined by GS‐5 examiners.   Given such a small 
level of representation, we exclude  these applications  from  the analysis,  though again 
we note that this exclusion is of little significance to our findings.  
C. Ex‐Ante Investments in the PTO vs. Ex‐Post Investments in Litigation 
Both  the  Patent  Office  and  the  courts  are  tasked  with  the  job  of  applying  the 
patentability  standards  and  assessing  the  validity  of  inventions  seeking  patent 
protection.  Some have proposed that investing greater resources at the Patent Office—
e.g., more examination hours—is  less cost effective than simply allowing the courts to 
correct the issuance of an invalid patent (Lemley, 2001).  The present analysis affords us 
an opportunity  to provide some back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations  that may  illuminate 
this  ex‐ante  /  ex‐post  debate.    For  these  purposes,  we  compare  the  increase  in 
expenditures  at  the  Patent Office  associated with  increasing  examination  hours  by  a 
certain specified amount with the decrease  in  litigation expenses that may ensue from 
such an  investment as a result of the  invalidation of weak patents at the Patent Office 
(as opposed to letting them issue at the Patent Office and be challenged at the courts).   
To guide  this discussion, consider  the simulation contemplated  in  the paper: giving all 
patent examiners  the same amount of examination  time extended  to GS‐7 examiners.  
Based on the results from Table 3 and the numbers provided in Table A1 and assuming 
300,000  application disposals per  year, we predict  that  an expansion  in hours of  this 
nature would  lead  to roughly 40,000  fewer patents being  issued each year.   Based on 
the calculations in Table A2, we predict that this expansion in hours will cost the Patent 
Office roughly $130 million in additional salary expenses.   
How much litigation expense will this investment in additional hours subsequently save 
in  return?    The  results  of  our  main  exercises  (as  supported  by  the  marginal  quality 
analysis set forth in Table 4) may suggest that the additional patents being issued on the 
margin as a result of binding time constraints may be of questionable validity.   To the 
extent that these marginal patents continue to be issued under current time allotments, 
they  may  indeed  generate  additional  litigation  expenses  to  the  extent  that  their 
questionable validity invites legal challenge.  Hence, it is possible that such expenses can 
be avoided  to  the extent  that such patents are not  issued by  the Patent Office  in  the 
first place.    It  is of course unfounded to assume that all  litigation can be circumvented 
by investing more at the Patent Office (or to assume, in the first place, that the litigation 
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system is able to effectively target the marginal patents in question).  The presence and 
extent of any litigation consequences are empirical questions.   
To confront these questions, we have collected  information on the  litigation outcomes 
associated with the applications considered in our sample using data obtained from the 
Lex  Machina  database.  Primarily,  for  each  individual  application,  we  have  collected 
information on the number of times any patent resulting from that application has been 
asserted  in  litigation.   With  this  information, we estimate specifications allowing us  to 
determine the relationship between the grade level of the examiner and the number of 
times the relevant application  is ultimately asserted at court.   Increases  in grade  levels 
may  lead  to  more  litigation  in  two  ways:  (1)  somewhat  mechanically,  the  greater 
number of patents issued as a result of grade level changes (per the main analysis of the 
paper)  will  lead  to  a  greater  probability  of  litigation  to  the  extent  that  only  issued 
patents can be the subject of  litigation  in the first place and (2) to the extent that the 
additional patents being issued on the margin as a result of the increased time pressures 
are  of  more  questionable  validity,  such  marginal  patents  will  invite  greater  legal 
challenge.  Since our goal is to understand how giving all examiners GS‐7 hours may lead 
to  a  reduction  in  overall  litigation  (to  match  such  gains  against  the  extra  payroll 
expenditures  calculated  above),  we  attempt  to  capture  both  such  mechanisms  by 
estimating  the  relationship between  grade  levels  and mean numbers of patent  cases 
associated with the claimed inventions using the sample of applications as the base.  In 
alternative specifications (Columns 4‐6 of Table A3), we estimate this relationship using 
only  the  sample  of  issued  patents—similar  to  the  JPO  and  EPO  specifications  in  the 
text—allowing us  to  target  the  second mechanism  in particular  (the marginal  validity 
component).7     
Since  patents  are  very  rarely  litigated  (only  7,000  of  the  issued  patents  in  our  PAIR 
sample  were  asserted  over  the  time  frame  of  our  analysis)  and  since  cases  only 
materialize a discrete number of times, we elect to approach this analysis from a count‐
based perspective and estimate negative binomial regressions of  the number of  times 
an  individual application  is ever asserted at court on  the grade  level of  the associated 
patent examiner.  With over a million observations and close to 9,000 examiners in our 
sample,  it  is beyond our computational means to  include examiner fixed effects  in this 
                                                            
7  That  is,  considering  that  the  number  of  issued  patents  increases  with  GS  levels  of  the 
examiners, if the mean number of future cases increases among the set of issued patents as GS 
levels increase, it would tend to suggest that the patents being issued on the margin as a result 
of GS‐level increases are generating greater litigation than the average patent issuance. 
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specification;  nonetheless, we  have  included  the  following  controls  in  an  attempt  to 
capture most of  the concerns  that motivated  the examiner  fixed effects specifications 
estimated throughout the paper: year fixed effects, examiner cohort fixed effects based 
upon  the  first  year  of  entry  with  the  Patent  Office,  examiner  experience  group 
dummies,  examiner  tenure  group  dummies  based  on  total  length  of  time  with  the 
Patent  Office,  and  technology  fixed  effects.    As  demonstrated  elsewhere  in  this 
Appendix, the  inclusion of such controls  in the grant rate specifications  leads to results 
that are nearly identical to examiner fixed effects specifications in that context.   
We present  the  results of  this exercise  in Table A3.   As predicted, we  find  that as  the 
grade  levels  associated  with  the  underlying  applications  increase  so  does  the  mean 
frequency by which such applications ultimately  lead to  litigation.   Relative to when an 
examiner was at GS‐7, applications  reviewed by examiners at GS‐14 are  litigated at a 
roughly 107 percent higher  rate  (Column 3).     The  results  from Columns 4‐6  likewise 
suggest that these effects may indeed partially be a response to the second mechanism 
identified above—that  is, the results from Columns 4‐6  imply that those patents being 
issued on the margin in connection with GS‐level changes are, as expected, more likely 
to be asserted in court relative to the average issued patent.   
With these estimates, we then perform a simulation analysis in Table A4 similar to that 
in A2  in which we predict  the  reduction  in patent  litigation expenses  that may  result 
from giving all examiners the number of hours extended to GS‐7 examiners.   For these 
purposes  we  use  information  on  the  cost  of  patent  litigation  from  the  American 
Intellectual Property Law Association  (AIPLA), capturing costs associated with: outside 
and local counsel; paralegal services; travel and living expenses; fees and costs for court 
reporters, copies, couriers, exhibit preparation, analytical testing, expert witnesses, and 
similar expenses.   We stress that the estimated  litigation costs savings presented here 
are  likely  underestimates.    Importantly,  the  litigation  expenses  used  are  one‐sided 
only—that is, we are only using costs associated with defending a suit, thereby omitting 
costs associated with  the parties asserting  the underlying patents  (though we suggest 
what  the  total  savings  would  be  assuming  that  plaintiff  costs  match  those  of  the 
defense).  Further, the results are likely underestimates to the extent we are only using 
costs associated with bringing cases  to  the end of  the discovery  stage of  trial.   Those 
cases that see trials through to judgments naturally garner much greater expenses.  The 
AIPLA  data  reports  costs  separately  for  cases  in  with  different  degrees  of  money  in 
controversy:  less than a $1 million, $1 to $10 million, $10 to $25 million and over $25 
million.  As Table A4 presents, even when we take the most conservative approach here, 
the amount of money saved through future litigation by giving all examiners GS‐7 hours 
10 
 
($161 million) is greater that the additional payroll expenses calculated in Table A3.  The 
net savings are likely to be even greater when we account for the fact that many cases 
fall  into  different  bins  of  the  amount  in  controversy  and  when  we  account  for  the 
litigation costs associated with asserting  litigation  (see Column 5 of Table A4) and  for 
the fact that some cases proceed beyond discovery.   Moreover, this simple back‐of‐the‐
envelope  comparison  is  just  focusing  on  direct  costs:  payroll  expenses  at  the  Patent 
Office versus  litigation expenses down the road.   The net benefits of eliminating more 
invalid patents early in the process by investing more resources at the Patent Office are 
likely  to be  even  larger  should one quantify  the  additional  social benefits  that might 
come  from  such  developments—e.g.,  the  avoidance  of  impediments  to  cumulative 
innovation in the period of time prior to when a court may have invalidated the invalid 
patent anyway.   
 
TABLE A2: SIMULATED INCREASE IN PAYROLL EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH GIVING 
ALL EXAMINERS THE NUMBER OF HOURS ALLOCATED TO GS-7 EXAMINERS FOR ONE 
YEAR OF APPLICATIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GS-level  
Number of 
Annual 
Dispositions by 
Examiners 
Mean 
Number 
of Hours 
Assigned 
Extra 
Hours 
Needed to 
Give GS-
7 Hours 
Examiner 
Pay Per 
Hour 
Extra Costs 
to Giving GS-
7 Hours 
GS-7 5,400 27.54 0 18.82 0 
GS-9 17,100 23.91 62,073 23.02 $1,428,920 
GS-11 29,700 21.28 185,922 27.86 $5,179,787 
GS-12 46,200 19.20 385,308 33.39 $12,865,434 
GS-13 59,100 16.66 643,008 39.70 $25,527,418 
GS-13, partial 
signatory 40,500 15.46 
489,240 39.70 $19,422,828 
GS-14 101,700 14.09 1,367,865 46.92 $64,180,226 
Total 300,000 - 3,133,416  $128,604,613 
Notes: This table assumes that the Patent Office disposes of 300,000 applications each year (where each 
request for a continued examination—RCE—does not constitute a new disposal).  This amount is consistent 
with the most recent information available on the Patent Office’s current aggregate disposal counts.  The 
distribution of dispositions per grade levels follows Table A1.  The mean number of hours per grade is 
calculated over the whole PAIR sample after assigning hour allotments to each application in the PAIR 
database based on the associated patent class and examiner grade level.  The examiner pay per hour assumes 
that the examiner is at Step 5 within the relevant grade and is based on the 2015 payscale.   
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TABLE A3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS LEVELS AND THE NUMBER 
OF TIMES INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS (OR INDIVIDUAL ISSUED PATENTS) ARE 
ASSERTED IN LITIGATION: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Incident Rate Ratios for:       
(Omitted: GS-7)       
GS-9 1.100 (0.215) 
1.115 
(0.218) 
0.952 
(0.121) 
1.039 
(0.204) 
1.052 
(0.206) 
0.879 
(0.215) 
GS-11 1.742*** (0.325) 
1.589** 
(0.294) 
1.254 
(0.285) 
1.580**   
(0.292) 
1.522** 
(0.280) 
1.133 
(0.257) 
GS-12 2.048*** (0.383) 
1.581** 
(0.292) 
1.279 
(0.292) 
1.681***   
(0.312) 
1.520** 
(0.281) 
1.114 
(0.253) 
GS-13 3.193*** (0.550) 
2.272*** 
(0.425) 
1.857** 
(0.454) 
2.454***   
(0.420) 
2.177*** 
(0.400) 
1.599* 
(0.393) 
GS-13 (with partial signatory 
authority) 
4.206*** 
(0.898) 
2.377*** 
(0.499) 
2.043*** 
(0.511) 
2.893***   
(0.598) 
2.207*** 
(0.452) 
1.733** 
(0.430) 
GS-14 4.542*** (0.798) 
2.387*** 
(0.454) 
2.071*** 
(0.493) 
2.955***   
(0.512) 
2.178*** 
(0.410) 
1.630** 
(0.385) 
N 1158689 1158689 990940 784947 785947 645573 
Experience Group Dummies? NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Examiner Cohort Fixed  
     Effects? NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Examiner Tenure Group  
     Dummies? NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Technology-by-Year Fixed  
     Effects and Application  
     Covariates? 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Unit of Observation Applica-tion 
Applica-
tion 
Applica-
tion 
Issued 
Patent 
Issued 
Patent 
Issued 
Patent 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered 
to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time.  Each observation in Columns 1‐3 is a given application from 
the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and that was published in the PAIR records between March, 2001 and July, 
2012.  Each observation in Columns 4‐6 is from a subset of those applications that ultimately issued as patents.  Each negative 
binomial regression includes an exposure variable equal to the difference between 2014 (when the Lex Machina litigation data 
was collected) and the year of disposition.  Technology‐by‐year effects are based on the 37 Hall et al. (2001) technology sub‐
categories.  Cohort fixed effects are based on the first year in which the relevant examiner joined the Patent Office, based on 
historical  rosters.   Tenure group dummies capture  the extent of  the examiner’s maximum experience  level with  the Patent 
Office: 0‐3, 4‐6, 7‐9, 10‐12, or 13‐15 years.       
 
   
12 
 
TABLE A4: SIMULATED REDUCTION IN LITIGATION EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH GIVING 
ALL EXAMINERS THE NUMBER OF HOURS ALLOCATED TO GS-7 EXAMINERS FOR ONE 
YEAR OF APPLICATIONS (ASSUMING CASES END IN DISCOVERY AND AMOUNTS IN 
CONTROVERSY < $1 MM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
   
 Decrease 
(Increase) in 
Future 
Litigation 
Costs:  
 
GS-
level  
Number of 
Annual 
Dispositions 
by 
Examiners 
Decrease in 
Number of 
Patent Cases 
per 
Application 
Decrease 
(Increase) in 
Future 
Number of 
Application-
Case Pairs 
Defense 
Costs Only 
Defense and 
Plaintiff 
Costs 
(Assuming 
Equal) 
 
GS-7 5,400 0 0 0 0  
GS-9 17,100 (0.0002) (2.662) ($522,560) ($1,045,120)  
GS-11 29,700 0.0008 24.467 $4,802,743 $9,605,486  
GS-12 46,200 0.0009 41.805 $8,206,262 $16,412,524  
GS-13 59,100 0.0028 164.269 $32,245,382 $64,490,764  
GS-13, 
partial 
signato
ry 
40,500 0.0034 137.002 $26,892,957 $53,785,914  
GS-14 101,700 0.0035 353.263 $69,344,121 $138,688,242  
Total 300,000 - 718.144 $160,597,488 $321,194,976 
Notes: This table assumes that the Patent Office disposes of 300,000 applications each year (where each 
request for a continued examination—RCE—does not constitute a new disposal).  This amount if 
consistent with the most recent information available on the Patent Office’s current aggregate disposal 
counts.  The distribution of dispositions per grade levels follows Table A1.  Figures in Column 2 are 
derived from the incident rate ratio results from Table A3 and account for the mean number of cases per 
application among GS-7 examiners.  Litigation expense information is from the 2013 Annual Survey of 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA).  Results from Columns 2 and 3 
determine the reduction in application-case pairs, as distinct from the number of cases themselves, 
considering that patent cases generally have multiple patents at issue in each case.  Litigation costs from 
the AIPLA, which are reported on a per case basis, are thus scaled by the mean number of patents per 
case (2.37), which we obtained from Ashtor et al. (2014).       
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D. Examiner Experience Analysis  
 
.TABLE A5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRANT RATES AND EXPERIENCE LEVELS 
OF THE ASSOCIATED PATENT EXAMINER, INCLUDING YEAR EFFECTS, COHORT 
EFFECTS AND TENURE EFFECTS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Omitted: 0-1 Years Experience   
2-3 Years Experience 0.120*** (0.005) 
0.124*** 
(0.006) 
0.094*** 
(0.006) 
0.090*** 
(0.005) 
0.073*** 
(0.004) 
4-5 Years Experience 0.187*** (0.006) 
0.185*** 
(0.007) 
0.119*** 
(0.009) 
0.102*** 
(0.007) 
0.077*** 
(0.006) 
6-7 Years Experience 0.247*** (0.006) 
0.233*** 
(0.009) 
0.135*** 
(0.014) 
0.100*** 
(0.009) 
0.072*** 
(0.007) 
8-9 Years Experience 0.281*** (0.007) 
0.264*** 
(0.010) 
0.136*** 
(0.019) 
0.088*** 
(0.012) 
0.057*** 
(0.009) 
10-11 Years    
     Experience 
0.306*** 
(0.007) 
0.292*** 
(0.012) 
0.135*** 
(0.024) 
0.079*** 
(0.015) 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
12-13 Years  
     Experience 
0.324*** 
(0.008) 
0.316*** 
(0.014) 
0.124*** 
(0.030) 
0.061*** 
(0.019) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
14+ Years Experience 0.335*** (0.011) 
0.344*** 
(0.017) 
0.107*** 
(0.037) 
0.033 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
N 1170869 1170869 1170869 1158689 1158689 
Year Fixed Effects?    
     (Year of  
     Disposition) 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Examination Tenure  
     (Max Experience)     
     Group Dummies?  
NO YES YES YES NO 
Examiner Cohort  
     Dummies? (First  
     Year at Patent  
     Office) 
NO NO YES YES NO 
Examiner GS Level  
     Dummies?   NO NO NO YES YES 
Examiner Fixed  
     Effects? NO NO NO NO YES 
*  significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; ***  significant at 1%.  Standard errors are  reported  in 
parentheses  and  are  clustered  to  correct  for  autocorrelation within  given  examiners  over  time.  
Each observation is a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and 
that was published  in  the PAIR  records between March, 2001  and  July, 2012.    Examiner  tenure 
effects are organized in the following groups: 0‐3 years, 4‐ 6 years, 7‐10 years, 11‐13 years, or 14‐
15 years.      
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Additional notes regarding Table A5: to better capture tenure effects, we also estimate 
specifications that condition the sample on those observations reviewed by examiners 
that left the office prior to the end of the sample period.  While we have omitted these 
findings for the purposes of brevity, the results from this alternative exercise mirror 
those presented in Table A5.  While we omitted the estimated coefficients for the 
cohort dummies and tenure group dummies in Table A5, we present such coefficients in 
Figures A1 and A2, where such effects are derived from the specification in Column 4 in 
Table A5, in which we control simultaneously for cohort, tenure, year and grade‐level 
effects.  
 
Figure A1: Estimated Cohort Effects from Regression of Grant Rates on Cohort Effects, Year Effects, Tenure 
Effects, Grade‐Level Groups and Examiner Experience Groups
Notes: this figure presents estimated coefficients of the cohort year dummies from the specification estimated in Column 4 
of Table A5.   
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Figure A2: Estimated Tenure Effects from Regression of Grant Rates on Cohort Effects, Year Effects, Tenure 
Effects, Grade‐Level Groups and Examiner Experience Groups
Notes: this figure presents estimated coefficients of the tenure group dummies from the specification estimated in Column 
4 of Table A5.   
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E. Additional Robustness Checks 
Examination Duration  Imbalance.   Given  that we only observe applications  filed after 
March 2001, one may also be concerned that applications reaching a final disposition in 
the early years  in  the  sample will be disproportionately  comprised of quicker moving 
applications, whereas those observed in the later years in the sample represent a richer 
mix of quick‐ and  slow‐moving applications.   This may be of consequence considering 
that  prosecution  durations  may  impact  grant  rates  due  to  the  higher  likelihood  of 
applicants abandoning their applications during long durations.  However, an increased 
incidence  of  longer‐duration  prosecution  periods  later  in  the  sample  does  not 
necessarily  confound  the  above  analysis  considering  (1)  the  imposition  of  year  fixed 
effects to capture any general trends in granting practices over the sample, (2) that we 
observe overlapping cohorts of examiners, in which event examiners are moving among 
each of the various grade  (and experience)  levels during every year of the sample and 
(3)  that  controls  are  available  for  the  time  between  filing  and  disposition  of  each 
application.  Nonetheless, to more comprehensively address any inconsistency in the set 
of  applications  under  investigation,  we  also  estimate  an  alternative  specification  in 
which  we  begin  the  period  of  observation  in  2004  and  confine  the  sample  of 
applications to those that are disposed of within a three‐year period.   By focusing only 
on applications of  limited prosecution duration, we ensure consistency  in  the  relative 
mix of application durations observed.8    In Figure A3, we demonstrate  that  the above 
results are likewise robust to this alternative sampling approach. 
 
   
                                                            
8  Of course, imposing this duration limitation forces us to exclude 2002 and 2003 as there will be 
few applications disposed of in these years that fall near the 3-year duration mark, despite the fact that we 
would observe more of such applications in the later sample years, which could otherwise undercut the 
balancing impulse of this exercise.   
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Figure A3:  Relationship between Examiner GS‐Level and Grant Rates, Restricted 
Duration‐Window Approach  
 
Notes: this figure presents estimated coefficients of a regression of the incidence of the application being granted on a set 
of dummy variables capturing the incidence of the relevant examiner falling into each general schedule pay grade.  This 
figure also includes year fixed effects and examiner fixed effects.  The sample is limited to those applications that reach a 
disposition within three years from filing and that were filed in 2004 and beyond.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
examiner level. 
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RCE Controls.  As demonstrated by Figure A4, the results are also robust to the inclusion 
of a control for the  incidence of a request‐for‐continued examination (RCE) associated 
with the application, which  is a device used by applicants to continue the examination 
process  in  the  face  of  an  examiner’s  final  rejection.   Given  the  tendency  of  RCEs  to 
prolong  the  examination  process,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  percentage  of  an 
examiner’s dispositions that involve an RCE filing will grow with experience.  With this in 
mind,  one  may  be  concerned  that  grant  rates  may  rise  with  experience  and/or 
promotions given  the possibility  that continuation devices such as RCE  filings  increase 
the ultimate  chances  that  the underlying  application will be  allowed.   Alleviating  this 
concern, we  find  that  the  estimated  pattern  of  results  persists  (though with  slightly 
smaller magnitudes) when controlling for the incidence of an RCE filing in the underlying 
application  and,  alternatively,  when  conditioning  the  analysis  on  those  applications 
without  an  RCE  filing.    The  results  remain  essentially  unchanged  with  alternative 
parameterizations of  these RCE controls  (available upon  request),  including  those  that 
count  the  total number of RCEs employed  (as distinct  from  the  incidence of any RCE 
presence) and those that  include separate dummy variables capturing different bins of 
RCE counts.   
 
Figure A4:  Relationship between Examiner GS‐Level and Grant Rates, Controlling for the 
Incidence of a Request for Continued Examination 
 
Notes: the specification underlying this figure replicates that of Figure 1, except that it includes a control for the incidence 
of the application undergoing at least one Request for Continued Examination.   
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Additional Robustness Checks on Specifications that Nest Experience Years within Grade 
Levels 
Figure A5:  Relationship between Grant Rates and Experience Years within Distinct Grade Levels, Including 
GS‐15
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 3 in the text except that it includes examiners at GS-15. 
 
Figure A6:  Relationship between Grant Rates and Experience Years within Distinct Grade Levels, Including 
GS‐15 and Conditional on Examiner Starting at least Below GS‐12 During Sample Window
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure A5 except that it excludes examiners that start the sample period at GS-12 and 
higher (that is, it excludes those examiners whose pre-sample-period tenures within the relevant grade are unobservable).  
Within this restricted sample, there are no observations (and thus no reported results) for examiners in the 4th and 5th period 
groups within the second GS-13 category.   
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Figure A7: Relationship between Obviousness Rejection Rate and Experience Years within Distinct Grade 
Levels,  Conditional  on  Examiner  Starting  at  least  Below  GS‐12  During  Sample  Window
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 6, except that it excludes examiners that start the sample period at GS-12 and 
higher (that is, it excludes those examiners whose pre-sample-period tenures within the relevant grade are unobservable).  
Within this restricted sample, there are no observations (and thus no reported results) for examiners in the 4th and 5th period 
groups within the second GS-13 category.   
 
Figure A8: Relationship between Obviousness Rejection Rate and Experience Years within Distinct Grade 
Levels, Including GS‐15 Examiners
Notes: this figure replicates that of figure 6 except that it includes GS-15 examiners. 
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Figure A9: Relationship between Obviousness Rejection Rate and Experience Years within Distinct Grade 
Levels, Including GS‐15 and Conditional on Examiner Starting at least Below GS‐12 During Sample Window
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure A8, except that it excludes examiners that start the sample period at GS-12 and 
higher (that is, it excludes those examiners whose pre-sample-period tenures within the relevant grade are unobservable).  
Within this restricted sample, there are no observations (and thus no reported results) for examiners in the 4th and 5th period 
groups within the second GS-13 category.   
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Graphs of Relationship between Each Rejection Type and GS‐Level  
Figure A10:  Relationship between Incidence of each of Section 101, Section 102, Section 103 and Section 
112 Rejections and Examiner GS‐Level (Percentage Results) 
Notes: each line represents the estimated mean coefficients of a separate regression of the incidence of the indicated 
rejection type on set of dummy variables capturing the incidence of the relevant examiner falling into each general 
schedule pay grade.  Coefficients are scaled by the mean incidence of each rejection type to facilitate an interpretation of 
this trend in percentage terms.  This figure also includes year fixed effects and examiner fixed effects.  
 
Figure A11:  Relationship between Incidence of each of Section 101, Section 102, Section 103 and Section 
112 Rejections and Examiner GS‐Level (Percentage Results), Controlling for Application Characteristics and 
Technology‐by‐Year Fixed Effects
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure A10, but it includes controls for application entity size, prosecution duration 
(and its square), and foreign priority, along with a full set of technology-by-year fixed effects.  
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Figure A12:  Relationship between Incidence of each of Section 101, Section 102, Section 103 and Section 
112 Rejections and Examiner GS‐Level (Percentage‐Point Results), Controlling for Application Characteristics 
and Technology‐by‐Year Fixed Effects
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure A11, but it does not scale the coefficients by the mean incidence of the relevant 
rejection.   
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Prior Art Citation Figures 
Figure A13:  Relationship between Number of Applicant‐Provided Citations in Final Patents (Logged) and 
Examiner GS‐Level
Notes: this figure presents estimated coefficients of a regression of the number of applicant-provided citations (logged) on 
a set of dummy variables capturing the incidence of the relevant examiner falling into each general schedule pay grade.  
This figure also includes year fixed effects and examiner fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the examiner level. 
 
Figure A14:  Relationship between Number of Examiner‐Provided Citations in Final Patents (Logged) and 
Examiner GS‐Level
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure A13 except that the dependent variable is the number of examiner-provided 
citations (logged). 
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Treatment of Examiners who Leave Agency and Return 
We note that 5 percent of the examiners  in our sample  left the Agency at some point 
only  to  return at a  later point  in  time.   With  the possibility  that  this hiatus  from  the 
Agency  may  disrupt  the  learning  /  interruption  story  hypothesized  in  the  text,  we 
estimate alternative  specifications  that  simply drop  these examiners.   The  results are 
virtually  identical  in  this alternative  specification  (results available upon  request  from 
the authors).   
 
 
Balanced Sample Analysis (Cont’d) 
Estimating balanced‐sample counterparts to Figure 3 (which follows examiners over the 
course of  years within  grade  levels  from GS‐12  to GS‐14)  is  tricky  insofar  as  it  is not 
possible to follow individual examiners over the entire course of many years set forth in 
the  figure  given  that  (1)  we  are  only  following  examiners  over  a  10‐year  period,  as 
opposed to the  longer period  implicitly depicted  in Figure 3 and (2)  it  is rare to find an 
examiner that stayed for a long period of time in every single grade.  In Figure 4, we take 
a step in the direction of achieving better balance by focusing only on those examiners 
that at least stared the sample period prior to GS‐12.  As such, Figure 4 avoids drawing 
information  from  examiners  that  start  our  sample  in  the middle  of  the  hypothetical 
trajectory  set  forth  in  the  figure.    In  Figure  A15,  we  take  this  one  step  further  and 
condition the analysis on those examiners that at  least start prior to GS‐12 and that at 
least ascend to GS‐14 during our sample window.  The pattern previously demonstrated 
of declines  in grant  rates over  the  temporal dimension  to  this graph and of  jumps  in 
grant rates upon promotion is generally maintained over this restricted sample. 
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Figure A15: Relationship between Grant Rate and Increases in Experience Years within Distinct Grade Levels, 
Conditional on Examiner Starting at least Below GS‐12 and Rising to GS‐14 During Sample Window 
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 4, except that it further conditions the sample to those applications reviewed by 
examiners that are observed to rise all the way to GS-14 over the sample period. 
 
 
As  stated  in  the  text,  one  of  the  concerns  with  Figure  3  is  that  there  are  a  limited 
number of examiners that stay at  least 7 years within grades 12, 13 (without signatory 
authority) and 13  (with signatory authority)  that  it may be difficult  to generalize  from 
the  experiences  of  these  examiners  to  predict  what  would  happen  if  we  forced  all 
examiners  (including those that rise  in  the ranks quickly) to stay that  long within each 
grade.   What  is more common, however,  is  that  those who at  least  rise  to GS‐14 will 
wind up  staying at  that  level  for many years.   This motivates an alternative balanced 
sample approach.  In Table A6, we focus on those examiners that (1) at least rise to GS‐
14  from a  lower grade during  the  sample period,  (2)  that at  least  stay at GS‐14  for 4 
years during the sample period and (3) that at  least took 4 years during the sample to 
rise to GS‐14.   We then take an event‐study approach  in which we estimate how their 
grant  rate  changes  in  the  period  approaching  the  jump  to  GS‐14  and  the  period 
following this promotion.  Rather than only looking at the four years leading up to GS‐14 
while  staying within GS‐13  (with  signatory  authority)—among  those who  stay  at GS‐
13(2)  that  long—this  alternative  approach  simply  follows  examiners  over  the  four 
preceding years regardless of what pre‐GS‐14 grade they were in that time.  Taking the 
former  approach  would  simply  be  too  restrictive  to  be  of  much  generalized  insight.  
Again, while  it  is very common for examiners to spend many years at GS‐14 once they 
reach that level (which we are trying to take advantage of with this balanced approach), 
there is much variation in how fast or slow they take to get to GS‐14 itself.   
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Consistent with expectations and with Figure 3, we observe a distinct jump in the grant 
rates (relative to the grant rate in the preceding periods) upon the promotion to GS‐14.  
Though the lagged coefficients are statistically insignificant, the point estimates suggest 
a subsequent decline in grant rates thereafter, consistent with Figure 3.  Note that The 
coefficient represented in each row represents the mean change in the grant rate as an 
examiner moves  into  the  indicated  time period  relative  to  the grant  rate prevailing  in 
the prior time period (in other words, the coefficients should not be interpreted as the 
cumulative  effect  of  the  indicated  time  period  relative  to  the  omitted  time  period), 
where  time  is measured with  reference  to  years prior  to  and  subsequent  to  a GS‐14 
promotion.      
 
TABLE A6: EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS OF GRANT RATES IN THE YEARS 
PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING THE PROMOTION TO GS-14 
  (1)  (2) 
   
(Omitted: 4+ Years Prior to GS-14 
Promotion)   
2-4 Years Prior to GS-14 Promotion -0.016** (0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
0-2 Years Prior to GS-14 Promotion -0.005 (0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0-2 Years Following GS-14 Promotion 0.018*** (0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
2-4 Years Following GS-14 Promotion -0.006 (0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
4+ Years Following GS-14 Promotion -0.005 (0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
N 145169 138811 
Sample restriction: minimum years of 
observation of examiners prior to GS-
14 promotion 
4 4 
Sample restriction: minimum years of 
observation of examiners following 
GS-14 promotion 
4 4 
Technology-by-Year Fixed Effects and 
Application Covariates? NO YES 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time.  
The  specification underlying  this Table  focuses on  those applications  reviewed by examiners 
that we observe being promoted to GS‐14 during the sample and that stay at GS‐14 for at least 
4  years  during  the  sample  period.   With  this  sample, we  then  regress  the  incidence  of  the 
application being granted on a series of lead and lag indicators for the timing of the associated 
examiners  GS‐14  status  (along  with  examiner  and  year  fixed  effects).    The  coefficient 
represented  in each row represents the mean change  in the grant rate as an examiner moves 
into  the  indicated  time period  relative  to  the  grant  rate prevailing  in  the prior  time period, 
where time is measured with reference to years prior to and subsequent to a GS‐14 promotion.    
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Figure A16: Relationship between Grade Levels and Grant Rates by Technology 
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Notes: each figure replicates that of Figure 1 except focusing separately on applications within the indicated 
technology.  Technology delineations follow the 37 Hall et al. (2001) sub-categories.   
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Hours-specific Interpretation of Results 
 
TABLE A7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRANT RATES AND ALLOCATED 
EXAMINATION HOURS 
  (1)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Allocated Examination Hours -0.0060*** (0.0004) 
-0.0136*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0097*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.0005) 
N 1158588 1158599 990889 990889 
Examiner and Year Fixed   
     Effects? YES YES YES YES 
PTO Class Fixed Effects? NO YES YES NO 
Application Covariates? NO NO YES YES 
Technology-by-Year Fixed   
    Effects? NO NO NO YES 
*  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1%.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time.  Each 
observation  is a given application  from  the PAIR database  that reached a  final disposition and  that 
was published in the PAIR records between March, 2001 and July, 2012.  Application covariates in this 
table include the incidence of a large entity applicant and the incidence of the filing of a Request for 
Continued Examination in connection with the application.  Technology‐by‐year effects are based on 
the  37  Hall  et  al.  (2001)  technology  sub‐categories.    The  allocated  examination  hours  scheduled 
(which  is  a  function of  the PTO  class of  the  application  and  the  grade  level of  the examiner) was 
obtained from the PTO pursuant to a FOIA request.   
 
Additional notes regarding Table A7: Time allotments are a function of both the grade 
level of the examiner and the technology of the application.  Table 3 in the text is meant 
to capture  fluctuations  in one of  these measures—that  is,  to capture  the  influence of 
changing grade levels on grant rates.  Of course, it is important in that initial analysis to 
include  technology  dummies  to  account  for  the  possibility  that  examiners  will  start 
reviewing different  technologies  following promotions.   Table 3 approaches  this using 
both  fine‐grained  dummies  for  each  Patent  Office  Class  and  the  more  aggregated 
technology  subcategories  (37  groups)  delineated  by Hall  et  al.  (2001).    In  this  hours 
specification,  we  likewise  endeavor  to  draw  upon  differences  in  grade  levels  of  the 
associated examiners to capture variation in examination hours, benefiting from the fact 
that applications are  randomly assigned across examiners of different grades.9    In  the 
case of  the present  table, however,  it  is  arguably more  critical  to use  the more  fine‐
grained PTO  classification on which hour‐allotments are based  in order  to  isolate  the 
                                                            
9   Any attempt to identify the effects of time allocation changes by drawing upon examiners 
switching across PTO Classes would be confounded by the difficulty in separating the time allocation effect 
and fixed differences in grant rates that may arise from technology effects more generally.   
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influence of promotions on time allotments (given the direct linking between PTO Class 
and hour allotments).  As such, the columns of greater interest here are Columns 2 and 
3 which  include PTO class dummies.   The findings from these columns suggest that an 
increase  of  one  hour  in  the  amount  of  time  allocated  to  review  an  application  is 
associated with a 0.5 to 1.4 percentage point reduction in the grant rate.  Considering a 
mean  hours  allocation  across  the  applications  in  the  analytical  sample  of  roughly  17 
hours, these results suggest that a doubling of examination hours—a benchmark used 
by Lemley (2001) to evaluate the merits of investing more in Patent Office examination 
resources—would  lead  to a 9  to 24 percentage‐point decrease  in  the grant  rate, or a 
roughly 13 to 34 percent decline.    
  One concern with  this approach  is  the  linear  treatment of any  time allocation 
effects.    The  main  approaches  taken  in  the  paper,  which  specific  the  relationship 
between grant  rates and a  series of grade  level dummies, are more  flexible and non‐
parametric in nature.  
 
 Treatment of Switching of Examiners during Applications.   
The  PAIR  dataset,  allows  us  to  identify,  for  each  application,  the  dates  upon 
which the application was docketed to an examiner, even if there are multiple docketing 
events over  the course of a  single application.    In over 70 percent of  the applications 
within this file, the records do not indicate any such docketing event after the period of 
time  in which  the  first office action on  the merits has  taken place.    In other words, a 
majority  of  time,  the  initial  examiner  sees  the  application  through  to  its  completion.  
There  is often more than one “docketing” record  in the period prior to the completion 
of the first office action, though our interviews with  examiners suggest that these initial 
recordings may capture a separate docketing with the Art Unit  itself and then with the 
ultimate examiner.   To be  clear,  the  fact  that a minority of applications experience a 
switch  in  examiners  between  the  first  office  action  and  the  final  disposal  of  the 
application is not overly problematic for our analysis.  When an examiner takes over an 
application from a prior examiner (e.g., upon their departure from the Agency), the new 
examiner  will  still  receive  a  “count”  for  bringing  the  application  to  its  disposal.  
Considering  that  examiners  face  expectations  over how many  counts  to  process  in  a 
specified  period  of  time,  the  new  examiner  is  still  subject  to  time  pressures  in 
completing the task of reviewing the application  in question.      Importantly, the degree 
of these time pressures will vary depending on the GS‐level of the examiner, which we 
seek  to  capture  in our  specifications.   Nonetheless,  in  Figure A17, we present  results 
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from an alternative specification  in which we focus only on those applications  in which 
there is no indication of an examiner replacement following the first office action.      
 
Figure A17: Relationship between Examiner GS‐Level and Grant Rates, Excluding Applications with Examiner 
Replacements 
 
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 1 except that it focuses only on the 775,091 applications within our sample in 
which the examiner completing the first office action was the same examiner completing the disposition of the application.   
 
Alternative Treatments of Time 
 The primary specifications capture the time at which the examiner reviews 
applications with reference to the time of disposition of the application in 
question.  In the minority of cases in which the examiner producing the disposal 
differed from the examiner completing the first office action, this approach will 
ensure that we capture the time period in which the new examiner is exerting her 
efforts.  For those situations in which the examiners stay with the same 
application to its completion, this approach will still ensure that we capture the 
period of time in which the examiner is exerting substantial effort on reviewing 
the application.  In Figure A18, we take an alternative approach in which we set 
year fixed effects and merge examiner roster information with each application 
based on the time of the first office action.  The pattern of results is robust to this 
alternative approach.  Since times of first office action are naturally before times 
of disposition, this alternative approach may assign lower GS levels to some 
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
G
ra
nt
 R
at
e 
at
 In
di
ca
te
d 
G
ra
de
 R
el
at
iv
e 
to
 G
S
-L
ev
el
 7
GS-7 GS-9 GS-11 GS-12 GS-13 (1) GS-13 (2) GS-14
Grade
Relative Grant Rate: Confidence Interval Relative Grant Rate: Mean
36 
 
applications relative to the primary specifications—in those cases where the 
promotion occurs throughout the course of the application.  As such, one might 
expect that this approach will attenuate any observed increases in grant rates upon 
promotion (relative to the primary results), to the extent that such promotions are 
not actually registered in the empirical specification.  Consistent with these 
expectations, though the same pattern of results is observed with this alternative 
approach, the magnitude of the observed rise in grant rates upon GS-level changes 
is smaller in this alternative approach relative to the primary specifications.  One 
can perhaps view these results as a lower bound estimate when these timing 
considerations in mind and the results presented in the text as upper bound 
estimates.  We note that the full pattern of results—e.g., Figure 3—are likewise 
robust to this alternative timing (full results available upon request).  We further 
note that, since we are merging examiner roster information to the PAIR database 
based on the moment of the first office action, the specification underlying this 
Figure focuses only on those applications in which the examiner completing the 
first office action is the same examiner producing the disposition, though the 
results are essentially identical when we make no such restriction.  Finally, the 
results are also similar to Figure A18 when we assign time based on the moment 
of initial filing or initial docketing, even though such moments may be prior to the 
time when the examiner actually commences examination. 
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Figure A_18: Relationship between Examiner GS‐Levels and Grant Rates, Assigning Time Based on the 
Moment of the First Office Action and Excluding Applications with Examiner Replacements
 
Notes: this figure replicates that of Figure 1 except that it assigns year effects and matches examiner roster information to 
the PAIR database based on the moment of completion of the first office action on the merits, while focusing only on the 
applications within our sample in which the examiner completing the first office action was the same examiner completing 
the disposition of the application. 
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Grant Rates of Fast vs. Slow Risers 
A simple observation of Figure 1 may lead to an endogeneity concern that the 
Patent Office is simply extending promotions once a given examiner’s grant rates 
rise to a certain level.  Figure 3 alleviates this concern by showing that grant rates 
are not increasing over time within each grade level.  To take matters further, we 
also seek to explore the inherent granting tendencies of those who are promoted 
quickly within the Patent Office versus those who rise more slowly.  For these 
purposes we focus on assessing promotion speed in the post-GS-11 range, where 
examiners began to spend more varied periods of time with each grade level.  We 
look at those examiners that we can observe in our sample as starting below GS-
12 and that rose to GS-14.  We then group this set of examiners into different bins 
depending on how quickly it took them to rise from GS-12 to GS-14.   Column 1 
of Table A8 compares the overall mean grants observed across these groups over 
the sample period.  The slow risers actually grant at substantially higher rates 
relative to the fast risers, easing the above-stated concern.  In Columns 2, we rule 
out that this observation can otherwise be explained by general year trends in the 
data.  In Columns 3 and 4, we add yet additional controls, including, among 
others, the GS-level of the examiners.  Since the goal of this exercise is to capture 
the inherent granting differences across these groups, it may benefit to account for 
the year-by-year change in other factors that also explain observed granting 
behaviors—e.g., time allocations.  The coefficients of the slow-rising category fall 
in magnitude as we add these additional controls, leaving us with statistically 
insignificant differences in grant rates across the various speed groups.  
Nonetheless, the point estimates continue to suggest that fast risers grant at lower 
rates relative to the slow risers.  At the least, this exercise does not find strong 
evidence suggestive of a story in which examiners are promoted for having 
demonstrated elevated granting behaviors.    
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TABLE A8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRANT RATES AND SPEED BY WHICH EXAMINERS 
ASCEND FROM GS-12 TO GS-14, AMONG EXAMINERS STARTING AT LEAST BELOW GS-
12 AND RISING TO GS-14 DURING SAMPLE WINDOW   
     
Speed in Rising from GS-
12 to GS-14 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Omitted Category: Fast 
Risers (Within 3 Years)     
Slower Risers (4-7 Years) 0.014 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
Slowest Risers (8+ Years) 0.124*** 
(0.272) 
0.116*** 
(0.027) 
0.050* 
(0.027) 
0.037 
(0.029) 
N 292020 292020 291333 291333 
Year Effects? NO YES YES YES 
GS-Level and Experience 
Effects? NO NO YES YES 
Cohort Effects and Tenure 
Effects (Total Years at 
Agency)? 
NO NO NO YES 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over 
time.      
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Falsification Exercises 
 
TABLE A9. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GRADE LEVELS AND CERTAIN 
IMMUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF INCOMING APPLICATIONS 
  (1)  (2) 
 INCIDENCE OF EPO OR JPO PRIORITY 
LARGE ENTITY 
STATUS OF APPLICANT  
Omitted: GS-7   
GS-9 -0.001 (0.003) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
GS-11 -0.002 (0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
GS-12 -0.000 (0.003) 
0.030 
(0.006) 
GS-13 -0.001 (0.004) 
0.030 
(0.006) 
GS-13 (with partial signatory 
authority) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.031 
(0.008) 
GS-14 0.002 (0.002) 
0.034 
(0.007) 
Omitted: 0-1 Years Experience 
N 990939 990939 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are 
reported  in  parentheses  and  are  clustered  to  correct  for  autocorrelation  within 
given  examiners  over  time.    These  specifications  track  those  of  Table  3  except 
replacing the  incidence of the application being granted as the dependent variable 
with: (1) the incidence of the application having been previously filed in the EPO or 
JPO  (Column  1)  or  (2)  the  incidence  of  the  applicant  being  of  large  entity  status 
(Column 2).    
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Figure A19: Scatter Plot of Frequency of Observations within Each GS‐Level / Experience Combination 
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